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ABSTRACT 
PROVINCIAL INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY: THE CASE OF NEWFOUNDLAND 
Statement of the Problem 
Although Canadian provinces have had international dealings since 
Confederation, these activities have apparently intensified since the 
1960's and provoked renewed interest among both politicians and 
academics. 
In an effort to understand the reasons for this renewed provincial 
activity and to evaluate its possible effects on federal and provincial 
spheres of jurisdiction, the emergent literature attempts to identify 
specific cases of transnational relations and develop typologies of 
interaction. 
This study attempts to add to the data base of provincial inter-
national activity by examining Newfoundland's activity in this area 
between 1960 and 1978. 
Materials and Methods 
Oral materials consisted of interviews of the administrative heads 
of Newfoundland provincial government departments or their representa-
tives as well as provincial politicians. The interviews were conducted 
in 1978-79. Written sources included government documents, legislative 
debates, books, scholarly articles, newspapers and miscellaneous unpub-
lished materials. 
ii 
iii 
The major assumptions to be tested are that the international 
activity of the province of Newfoundland is not atypical of the activity 
of other Canadian provinces, and that interest and involvement in inter-
national activity on the part of the province is a function of the 
perceived importance of specific issues and policy areas, rather than 
a desire to generally assert a provincial competence in external rela-
tions. Interviews were therefore conducted with governmental respon-
dents with a view toward collecting data of recent provincial external 
activities and of eliciting attitudes toward the provincial role in 
Canada's foreign relations. 
The procedure was inductive. Initially, all pertinent materials 
were gathered. Subsequently the data was classified into distinct cate-
gories for analysis and generalization. 
Conclusions 
The nature of provincial international activity largely relates to 
functional administrative matters, but even these may raise broader 
national and international legal issues. 
Newfoundland, as a provincial actor in international relations, 
conducts itself on a level comparable with other provinces though on a 
much smaller scale. There is no indication that the province's inter-
national activity is anything other than a process pursued for the 
fulfillment of immediate and long term functional needs. There is no 
evidence to warrant the conclusion that the attainment of an interna-
tional presence or status is a policy of the Newfoundland government. 
Indeed, in most cases, the activity is not even perceived as being 
international. 
iv 
Research in this area has to date focused on relations between 
provinces and American states. The findings of this study indicate that 
Newfoundland is somewhat more active than other provinces in interna-
tional contacts with states other than the United States. One possible 
explanation for this tendency may be found in Newfoundland's history 
but definitive conclusions must await further research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The British North America Act (1867) is all but silent on the issue 
of external affairs. Section 132 of the Act, which provides for federal 
jurisdiction and control of "empire" treaties, is no longer applicable. 
Today, Canada interacts with foreign states in its own right. In 1937, 
the Labor Conventions Case 1 effectively bifurcated the treaty power by 
providing for plenary federal jurisdiction on issues under federal 
constitutional control but requiring provincial cooperation in the 
implementation of treaties whose subject matter falls under Section 92 
of the B.N.A. Act. In other words, the federal government may conclude 
treaties and undertake international obligations in the same manner as 
a unitary state. However, where the subject matter of a treaty falls 
within provincial jurisdiction, implementation is a provincial concern. 
Thus, the federal government cannot guarantee to foreign states that it 
can honor treaties whose subject matter is in the provincial domain 
without provincial enabling legislation. In this context the question 
has arisen as to what executive role provinces may exercise in the treaty-
making process. In other words, if provinces are empowered to implement 
the terms of treaties, does it follow that they have the executive power 
to enter into treaties where the subject matter falls under their juris-
diction as defined by the constitution? 
This question forms part of what is in this paper referred to as 
the provincial argument for a treaty-making role in Canada. Couched 
primarily in legal and constitutional terms this argument relies heavily 
1 
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on international law and the practice of other federal states. Generally 
it may be said that while there is precedent in international law and 
in the practice of federal states for the participation of subunits of 
states in international affairs, the state, as recognized under inter-
national law and practice, is the basic unit of competence. Its compo-
nent units are permitted active involvement in foreign relations only 
to the degree stipulated in its constitution. 
In the Canadian case this situation merely adds to the force of 
argument of those supporting the federal position which holds that only 
the federal government may make treaties with foreign states. The issue 
is not resolved, however, because the Canadian constitution is not defi-
nitive on this point. 
Canadian literature on federalism and foreign affairs has emphasized 
the legal and constitutional aspects of the question, 2 which has remained, 
in essence, a hypothetical construct. Couched in terms of, "Do the 
provinces have a treaty-making capacity?" "Should provinces have such 
capacity?" "From what source would authority for such capacity emanate?" 
etc., the question has remained academic through several generations of 
scholarly journals, conferences and symposia. 
The question is not unique to Canada. Comparative literature on 
federalism and foreign affairs 3 has focused on this issue in other 
federal states but with somewhat different results. While the question 
is not unique to this country, Canada may well be a unique case. In 
most other federal states, definitive constitutional provisions settle 
the issue or some combination of factors involving the previous indepen-
dence of component units helps to provide an answer. 
3 
It is misleading to suggest that there is no answer in Canada's 
case. Perhaps the most obvious argument for a plenary federal treaty-
making power is the most appropriate--that it is necessary. In a nation 
as diverse as Canada, eleven foreign policies would be impossible to 
coordinate and ultimately self-destructive. Generally, international 
law accepts international activity by subunits of federal states if such 
activity is sanctioned by the federal constitution. The ultimate test 
would lie in the action of a sovereign state agreeing to deal with the 
component unit of a federal state. 
The necessity for Canada or any other federal state to act inter-
nationally with one voice is almost self-evident. Such a conclusion 
does not negate the possibility that Canadian provinces as well have a 
role to play beyond that of merely implementing the terms of treaties 
concluded by the federal government. It is this role which this paper 
addresses. 
The study of international activity by Canadian provinces is a new 
f . . 4 area o 1nqu1ry. The emerging literature examines the nature of this 
activity, its raison d'etre, its intent, and the motives of provinces. 
It is tentatively concluded that provincial international activity is 
essentially non-threatening to federal pre-eminence in foreign affairs. 
Basically administrative and functional in nature, it forms part of 
the day-to-day activities of provincial administrations and is not 
perceived as international activity in many cases. It has emerged on a 
de facto basis and reveals much about the economic, social, cultural 
and political diversity of the Canadian confederation. 
As one would expect, students of this process have directed their 
attention to the larger and more populous provinces. This study is an 
examination of the international activity of the province of Newfound-
land, with special emphasis on the nature and extent of such activity. 
Newfoundland has received little attention in this regard and this is 
4 
at least partly because the extent of international involvement by Cana-
dian provinces is a function of economic strength. However, wealth or 
lack thereof is not the only explanation for the degree of provincial 
international activity. Many factors are involved and some provi?ces 
undoubtedly have unique reasons for their actions. This study is under-
taken in the interests of expanding our understanding of this process 
through an examination of the international activity of the Province of 
Newfoundland. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS POWER 
A. The Constitutional Context 
The only reference to external affairs in the British North America 
Act is found in Section 132: 
The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all 
powers necessary or proper for performing the obligations 
of Canada or of any Province thereof, as part of the 
British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under 
Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries. 
Under this provision, the Canadian Parliament was empowered to replace 
the British Parliament as the appropriate agency to enact legislation 
to implement obligations incumbent upon Canada as a result of treaties 
negotiated by the Imperial government. Here, the supremacy of federal 
over provincial legislation was clear. However, neither Section 132, 
nor any other provision of the BNA Act answered the question of what 
would happen when Canada negotiated a treaty or convention applicable 
only to Canada and signed on behalf of the Canadian government. The 
answer to this question has evolved through judicial decision from the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Three cases in particular are 
relevant. 
In 1919, Canada entered into the Convention Relating to the Regu-
lation of Aerial Navigation, which resulted from the Peace Conference 
at Paris. The Convention was subsequently ratified by the King on 
behalf of the British Empire, and the Canadian representative signed 
6 
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for Canada under the title of, and as a member of the British Empire. 
In accordance with the obligations undertaken by Canada, the Canadian 
Parliament enacted the Air Board Act of 1919, relating to the control 
and regulation of aeronautics in Canada. This legislation was challenged 
as being ultra vires of the federal government. On appeal from the 
1 Supreme Court of Canada, the Judicial Committee relied on Section 132 
as a basis for upholding the federal legislation. The decision, 
however, was read by some jurists as an indication that the Judicial 
Committee was prepared to recognize the right of the federal government 
to enact implementing legislation relevant to the exercise of its 
treaty-making power even in fields otherwise reserved to the province. 2 
In the "Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada" 
case, the Judicial Committee found that the Convention was not an 
"Empire Treaty" and thus not covered by Section 132, but that "it comes 
to the same thing," 3 or, in other words, is intra vires the federal 
government. In this case, Canada had concluded an agreement with 
seventy-nine other countries, known as the International Radio Telegraph 
Convention, in 1927. It was subsequently ratified on behalf of His 
Majesty's Government in Canada by an instrument signed by the Secretary 
of State for External Affairs. The implementing legislation, titled 
4 the Radio Telegraph Act, was challenged as being ultra vires of the 
Canadian Parliament. Their lordships ruled that legislation adopted as 
a result of the Convention could be supported by the initial words of 
Section 91, authorizing the Canadian government to make laws for the 
peace, order and good government of Canada. In effect, the validity of 
this legislation was held to stem from the operation of the residuary 
clause, and not Section 132. 
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On this basis, legal opinion in Canada held that the federal parli-
ament possessed all of the State's performing power, 5 and that the 
provinces were effectively excluded from the process. This position 
was repudiated, however, in the Labor Conventions Case in 1937. In 
this case, the courts were called upon to decide the validity of legis-
lation which Parliament intended to enact, to fulfill the obligations 
of three labor conventions, namely, the Weekly Rest Convention, the 
Minimum Wage-Finding Machinery Convention and the Hours of Work Conven-
tion.6 The Privy Council held that any Parliamentary implementing 
legislation would be invalid. 7 The essence of this decision was stated 
by Lord Atkin as follows: 
In totality of legislative powers, Dominion and Provinces 
together, she (Canada) is fully equipped. But the legis-
lative powers remain distributed and if in the exercise of 
her new functions derived from her new international status 
she incurs obligations they must, so far as legislation be 
concerned when they deal with provincial classes of 
subjects, be dealt with by the totality of powers, in other 
words by cooperation between the Dominion and the provinces.8 
There have been indications of a judicial retreat from this phil-
osophy. In the "Canada Temperance Federation Case," in 1946, the 
Judicial Connnittee "appeared to give a strong endorsement to the wide 
view of federal powers set forth in the Aeronautics and Radio cases."9 
In addition, a former member of the Committee, Lord Wright, has strongly 
supported the constitutional approach enunciated in the Aeronautics, 
Radio, and Canada Temperance cases. However, the federal government 
has not attempted to challenge the "Labor Conventions" decision, but 
has followed the general practice of consulting with the provincial 
governments concerning treaties on matters within the normal provincial 
fields of legislative competence. 
Within this context, the province of Quebec has notably but not 
exclusively asserted a provincial role in Canadian treaty-making. The 
federal government has countered with arguments appealing to a number 
of sources. 
B. Arguments Supporting Plenary Treaty-Making 
Powers of the Federal Government 
Proponents of an exclusive federal role in treaty-making have 
looked to the intentions of the "founding fathers" of Confederation for 
support. Sir John A. MacDonald stated that "all the great questions 
which affect the general interests of the Confederacy as a whole, are 
confided to the Federal Parliament." 10 Similarly, Alexander Galt 
declared that among the subjects given to the general government would 
be found "all that could in any way be considered of a public and 
11 general character." In describing the B.N.A. Act to the House of 
Lords, Lord Carnarvon, the colonial secretary, said that the House 
proposed to give to the central authority "those high functions and 
almost sovereign powers by which general principles and uniformity of 
legislation may be secured in those questions that are of common import 
11 h . 1112 to a t e prov1nces. 
Further underpinnings of this view involve an appeal to the fact 
that the Dominion was given the power to appoint provincial Lieutenant-
9 
Governors and that while the provinces may amend their own constitutions, 
they lack the power to alter in any way the office of Lieutenant-
Governor. In addition, the Dominion was given the pre-eminent right to 
reserve and disallow provincial legislation. 
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In arguments supporting a broad view of Dominion powers, consider-
able importance is attached to the opening paragraph of Section 91 of 
the B.N.A. Act, where the Dominion is given power to make laws for the 
peace, order, and good government of Canada in relation to all matters 
not exclusively assigned to the provincial legislatures. This phrase 
and its variation, "peace, welfare and good government," were habitually 
used by British colonial authorities in vesting colonial legislatures 
with the full range of their legislative powers. 
In general, the framers of the B.N.A. Act proposed a strong central 
government. In addition to the power to reserve and disallow provincial 
legislation, the financial settlement reached was indicative of their 
intent. The Dominion was given an unrestricted taxing power while 
receiving nearly four-fifths of former provincial revenues. These facts 
certainly indicate an intention to create a powerful central government 
in a federal state marked by the division of legislative power into 
provincial and federal spheres of competence. It remains a matter for 
speculation, however, as to the exact meanings intended to be given to 
the general words used in outlining these exclusive spheres of power. 13 
Edward McWhinney has stated, "the federal government exercises 
plenary treaty power largely on the basis of domestic political practice 
and international consent; in strict law, they operate in a constitu-
tional vacuum." 14 This vacuum, according to supporters of the federal 
position, is at least partly filled in the instructions and commissions 
of the old colonial governors, the Letters Patent and Instructions to 
the present office of Governor-General, the statutory authority conferred 
on the executive by Parliament, and the prerogatives of the Crown. The 
11 
f ederal argument is that the prerogatives of the Crown were transferred 
to the federal executive through these means. Since it is the Crown to 
which foreign states look when consummating international agreements, 
and since the federal cabinet actually negotiates and concludes such 
agreements, the plenary treaty power resides exclusively in the federal 
government. 
In other words, the federal executive acquired the treaty-making 
power through two processes: the process by which the central executive, 
rather than the British executive, advised the Crown--a process involving 
Canadian membership on British negotiating teams, separate Canadian 
negotiations but British signature of treaties, and finally the entire 
process under Canadian control although symbolically Imperial; and, the 
process by which Canada nationalized the Crown--signified by Canadian 
nomination of the Governor-General who exercises all the Crown's prerog-
atives including those relating to treaties, and the use of Canadian 
seals and symbols in the exercise of these powers. 15 
These processes point to the assumption of independent status by 
Canada and the focusing of power as regards treaties, diplomatic rela-
tions, and in general the conduct of international affairs, in the 
central executive. "This taking of full sovereignty carried with it 
all the competence of international personality, which was recognized 
by the international community. An essential and inseparable element 
of this sovereignty is the power to conclude treaties, which need not 
find its source in any grant or transfer." 16 Similarly, Ivan Rand has 
argued that the nature of foreign affairs as conducted by the British 
government, wherein treaty-making and implementation was treated as a 
12 
"discrete and entire subject-matter," was, in that nature, passed to 
the Dominion under Section 132. But assuming treaty-making to be an 
entirety as legislative matter, its transmission is received only in 
17 the residual power of the federal government. The notion that 
authority in external relations is a concomitant of sovereignty finds 
support also in the American federal experience. In the Curtiss-Wright 
case, Justice Sutherland considered the source of federal competence in 
the foreign affairs area. He stated that, 
• the investment of the federal government with the 
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the 
affirmative grants of the constitution. The powers to 
declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, 
to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, 
if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, 
would have vested in the federal government as necessary 
concomitants of nationality. • • Otherwise, the United 
States is not completely sovereign.18 
Against these positions, Canadian provinces, particularly Quebec, have 
advanced arguments for a provincial treaty-making role. 
C. Arguments Supporting a Treaty-Making 
Role for Canadian Provinces 
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the provincial argu-
ment for a treaty-making capacity has a number of limitations. Consti-
tutionally, the provinces are limited to their enumerated powers. 
Provisions in the B.N.A. Act for agreements between provinces or agree-
ments between a province and a foreign state, do not exist. 
If a province purported to make an enforceable agreement 
with a foreign state it has no domestic validity because 
any implementing legislation would fail as being action 
taken in pursuance of a non-existing power to accept 
international commitments.l9 
13 
This point finds support as well in Section 3 of the Statute of West-
minster which confirms in the federal government, but not in the 
provinces, the right to enact laws having extraterritorial effect. To 
this may be added the rather narrow limits which the courts have drawn 
on the extra-provincial effect of provincial action. In this area, the 
courts have held that it "must be no more than a mere incident of the 
l .d . 11 1 1 . . " 20 va 1 , essent1a y oca act1v1ty. 
The provincial argument has a number of facets. Firstly, limi ta-
tions on a provincial treaty-making power are nowhere stated and an 
exclusive federal treaty power is not explicit in Canadian constitu-
tional documents. The exclusive right conceded to the provinces to 
implement certain treaties must logically carry with it the right to 
negotiate and sign these treaties, or, as posed by Hendry, the question 
becomes, "If the provinces have the right to legislate on subject matter 
or international agreements within their legislative competence, does 
not the theory of the executive power following legislative power give 
them the right to enter into, or at least assist in, the negotiation of 
21 
such agreements?" One answer has come from Chief Justice Duff of the 
Canadian Supreme Court who argued in the Labor Conventions case that 
provincial executive authority is derived from the delegated power of 
the Governor-General. This authority extends to all matters necessarily 
implied in the grant of legislative powers contained in Section 92, and 
no further. Section 92 nowhere gives the provinces any authority to 
. h f . 22 enter into agreements w1t ore1gn states. In effect, this is the 
reverse of the federal argument that the right to negotiate and sign 
treaties should logically include powers of implementation. It is 
14 
submitted that the federal argument is better based, both in interna-
tional law, as will be shown, and in constitutional documents, as indi-
cated above. Certainly, for the provinces to argue the validity of this 
position because it is nowhere prohibited, is to base their argument on 
tenuous grounds indeed. In short, this argument allows for provincial 
claims but is not in itself an argument to support these claims. 
Secondly, it is argued that constituent member units of certain 
federal states other than Canada are constitutionally empowered to enter 
. 1 . h. 23 1nto treaty re at1ons 1ps. On this point Laskin has noted that the 
units of some federal states may and have been involved in foreign 
relations through reciprocal arrangements which are carried into effect 
by legislation on each side but without establishing agreement in the 
sense of mutual obligation. The sanction lies in the taking of recip-
1 . 24 roca act1on. These are usually concurrent measures on matters of 
mutual concern, as between certain northern American states and Canadian 
provinces in areas of fire prevention and flooding. 25 
Thirdly, in the draft codification of treaty law prepared by the 
International Law Commission, some of the active participants in the 
work of the specialized agencies were not fully independent sovereign 
states. In this regard, it may be noted that Byelorussia and Ukraine 
are charter members of the United Nations, but they are by no means 
sovereign states. However, this aspect of the provincial argument finds 
its answer in international practice where the section of the draft 
. 1 h 1 f . . . 26 . i d . . art1c es on t e aw o treat1es 1n quest1on 1s recogn ze , 1n 1nter-
national experience, as a polite bow to the constitutional forms of 
United Nations members. It may also be argued that this situation stems 
15 
from political expediency and in no way reflects the true international 
legal status of the Ukraine and Byelorussia. 
This brief examination of provincial arguments for an extended 
treaty-making role has raised a number of questions which may be further 
explored and evaluated by considering the practice of other federal 
states and in terms of international law. 
D. The Practice of Selected Federal States as Regards 
the Role of their Constituent Members in 
International Relations 
Proponents of an extended provincial role in Canadian treaty-making 
have sought support in the practice of other federal states where the 
member units engage in international relations. These states include 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, and the United States. 
1. Federal Republic of Germany 
"There is no doubt in German theory or practice about the partial 
capacity of the member states under international law ••• " 28 This 
capacity was entrenched in the old Imperial Constitution, was extended 
through the Weimar Constitution, and under the Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic "the states have, with respect to foreign policy, greater 
rights under the Basic Law than under the Weimar Constitution. 
Perhaps the most important reason for the continuation of this 
constitutional theme is the fact that the German Empire, formed in 1871, 
was composed of sovereign and independent states which, prior to union, 
exercised all the attributes of states as defined by international law. 
16 
Thus, under Article 11 of the Imperial Constitution, the Kaiser as the 
presiding officer of the newly formed federation, was defined as the 
representative of the Reich in international and private law, while the 
member states retained the power to have relations with other member 
states and foreign countries in matters outside the exclusive competence 
of the federation. 
The new federation established under the Imperial Constitution 
allowed considerable leeway within the framework of the constitution for 
the states composing it. Article 56, Section 2, for example, prohibited 
the states from establishing new consulates in districts administered 
by consuls of the federation, with a view toward the ultimate abolition 
30 
of all state consulates. On the other hand, there was no restriction 
on the member states with respect to the right to receive consuls from 
foreign nations; a state government could give an exequatur to consuls 
f f . 31 rom ore1gn states. 
In the area of treaties, the Imperial Constitution, Article 11 (1), 
held that the Kaiser had the power to enter, in the name of the Reich, 
into alliances and other treaties with foreign states. The power of 
the member states remained extensive, however, as they were empowered 
to enter into treaties in specific areas such as extradition. In areas 
only facultatively within the competence of the Reich, the member states 
could conclude treaties as long as the Reich had not done so, as well 
as in matters that were neither exclusively nor optionally within the 
competence of the Reich. For example, in areas such as regulation of 
traffic on a common border, questions of improvement of land, and 
exploitation of water power which lay partly abroad, the member states 
17 
could conclude treaties with foreign states, the only restriction being 
that such treaties could contain nothing that was incompatible with the 
1 f h f d . 32 aw o t e e erat1on. 
Under the Weimar Constitution, the rights of the member states to 
have relations with foreign countries were considerably restricted 
through Article 78 (1), which provided that the cultivation of relations 
with foreign states should be exclusively a matter for the Reich. 33 
This is not to say that the Reich became, under the Weimar Constitution, 
a unitary state, although its federal nature was somewhat diluted. 
In contrast to the Imperial Constitution, under which the states 
could send and receive ambassadors from foreign states, this right was 
denied under the Weimar Constitution. Similarly, the right to have 
consulates in foreign countries ceased to exist for the states. 34 
The rights of the Lander in treaty-making with foreign states 
remained essentially unchanged from the provisions of the Imperial 
Constitution to the Weimar Constitution with one important exception: 
treaties concerning matters within exclusive Lander jurisdiction could 
still be concluded but only with the approval of the Reich. 35 
This, then, is the constitutional situation in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. In practice, however, the situation is somewhat different; 
Walter Leisner observes that, 
German federalism is threatened by the increasing legal and 
financial power of the federation, but even more so by the 
political lethargy of the member states and their incapacity 
to organize an attractive political life of their own and 
to contribute efficiently to the shaping of federal policy: 
there are almost no particular political parties left in 
the Lander.36 
Leisner argues that German federalism is underdeveloped in the sense 
that "its practical efficiency no longer corresponds to the important 
rights guaranteed by the constitution to the member states."37 This 
view is echoed by Rand when he states that "the recent trend in the 
German Federal Republic has been, in fact, not towards a greater exer-
cise by the Lander of their treaty power, but towards a delegation of 
38 it to the central government." This practical devolution of consti-
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39 tutionally recognized powers has occurred through agreement and through 
the attitude of third parties to treaties with the Lander. For example, 
in 1965, the Land of Niedersachsen completed a treaty (Konkordat) with 
the Vatican. Niedersachsen considered that it had plenary constitu-
tional powers to conclude a treaty with the Vatican and deliberately 
limited itself to a courtesy, "for your information only," notification 
to the federal government of the signing of the Konkordat. However, 
the Vatican itself submitted the text of the Konkordat to the West 
German foreign minister for approval and endorsement; and the federal 
government, against the view of the Land, exercised "what it clearly 
considered to be its constitutional right to endorse the Land agreement 
with the Vatican."40 
2. Switzerland 
The Swiss Constitution, like the Basic Law of the German Federal 
Republic, is explicit in its provisions regarding foreign affairs. As 
in Germany a centralizing tendency has been historically evident, 
although the process began somewhat earlier in the constitutional life 
of Switzerland. 
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In 1848, the organic law which at present forms the basis of the 
fundamental law of the Confederation was adopted by a large majority of 
the Swiss people. Under this constitution, the cantons, although 
prevented from entering into foreign alliances, retained considerable 
power in the treaty-making process, particularly with regard to the use 
41 
of Swiss troops serving under foreign flags. This practice and other 
42 factors brought Swiss political elites to the realization that a 
strong central authority with the power to control not only political 
but also commercial arrangements with foreign states was desirable. 43 
A revision of the Swiss constitution in 1874, reflected this 
concern. Although the wording of the articles concerned with treaty-
making44 remained essentially the same, the wording of Article 9, which 
reserves the right to the cantons to conclude exceptional alliances was 
changed. The opening word "toutefois" was replaced by the word "excep-
tionellement. ,.4S 
The Swiss constitution of today is virtually unchanged from the 
revisions of 1874. Under Article 8, the Confederation is given the 
exclusive power to declare war and conclude peace and make alliances 
and treaties with foreign states. Article 9 provides that the cantons 
may conclude treaties with foreign states in matters of public economy, 
frontier relations and police, but that such treaties may contain 
nothing prejudicial to the Confederation or the rights of other cantons. 
Article 10 holds that relations between the cantons and foreign govern-
ments must take place through the Federal Council. Finally, Article 
102 establishes the powers and duties of the Federal Council, including 
the power to examine treaties concluded by the cantons between themselves 
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or with foreign states and to give or withhold its approval, and to 
concern itself with the interests of the Confederation abroad, 11paying 
particular notice to its international relations, and has general charge 
of foreign affairs. 11 
The scope of the cantonal treaty power is rather broad with regard 
to the subject matter of treaties, but the cantonal power to negotiate 
with foreign states and to conclude treaties is very narrow due to the 
provisions of Article 10 of the constitution. Only with regard to the 
subject matters in Article 9, may the cantons correspond directly with 
"subordinate" authorities of foreign states. Thus, treaties concluded 
by the cantons with foreign states deal, for example, with the trans-
mission of electric current through a part of foreign territory, protec-
46 tion of river sources, mutual admission of theatre groups, etc. --matters 
not unlike those on which Canadian provinces and American states have 
concluded agreements. 
Plenary control over foreign relations is vested in the Federal 
Assembly through Article 8 of the Constitution. This includes the power 
to enter into international agreements and equally to perform the 
obligations attendent upon such capacity. If there is any doubt as to 
the control exerted by the Federal Assembly in foreign relations, it is 
effectively dispelled by the mechanisms available to it in the implemen-
tation process. The central authority treads lightly when implementation 
of the terms of a treaty requires transgressing the legislative juris-
diction of the cantons. However, it has three constitutional mechanisms 
to aid it in the process. Firstly, it may, by constitutional practice, 
legislate on the subject within cantonal control under its power to 
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perform treaty obligations. Secondly, it may put the treaty to the test 
of a popular referendum and so acquire legislative jurisdiction by what 
would in effect be a constitutional amendment. Finally, the Federal 
Assembly may institute a constitutional amendment under the authority 
f A . 1 121 f h . . 47 o rt1c e o t e const1tut1on . 
As in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Swiss 
central government exercises its extensive powers in foreign affairs 
while the activity of the cantons in this area has become less impor-
48 tant. 
3. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
The role of Union Republics of the Soviet Union in international 
relations is small, despite the membership of two Republics 49 in the 
United Nations and constitutional provisions which are, perhaps, more 
permissive than those governing the Swiss cantons or the German Lander. 
Aspaturian had identified four distinct phases of the role of the 
Union Republics in Soviet foreign affairs. The first phase extends from 
1918 to the de facto formation of the union in mid-1923. It was charac-
terized by the existence of the Republics as formally independent states 
with separate diplomatic establishments. During this period, the 
Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidzhan, as well as the 
two Central Asian Soviet People's Republics of Bukhara and Khorezm had 
their own Commissariats for foreign affairs. Each of these republics 
maintained modest diplomatic relations, contracted a number of treaties 
and agreements with bordering states and participated in a number of 
international conferences. However, despite the absence of a central 
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foreign affairs commissariat, their foreign policies were uniformly 
predetermined and shaped by the ruling communist party which operated 
in all republics and their diplomacy was closely supervised and coordi-
nated by the paternalistic guidance of the Russian Socialist Federated 
Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). 50 
The diplomatic activities of the eight non-Russian republics were 
governed by a series of bilateral treaties signed between the R.S.F.S.R. 
and the individual republics. These treaties were held to be compacts 
concluded between sovereign states51 and were signed by their respective 
Commissars of Foreign Affairs as international legal instruments. These 
treaties provided not only for the fusion of military, economic, finan-
cial, communications, and foreign trade activities, but also introduced 
a system of partially interlocking and overlapping internal political 
institutions. A common feature of all these arrangements was the delib-
. . . 1 d f . 1 d"ff . f f . ff . 52 erate 1nst1tut1ona an unct1ona 1 us1on o ore1gn a a1rs. 
The second phase in the role of the union republics in foreign 
affairs covered the approximate life of the 1924 Soviet constitution 
(1924-1938) and was marked by institutional centralization of foreign 
affairs in Moscow but within a framework which gave the republics 
limited though significant internal administrative responsibility and 
. d . b d 53 restr1cte representat1on a roa • The U.S.S.R. agreed to assimilate 
all contractual obligations of the republics insofar as they affected 
the territories of the republics concerned: 
The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR 
is charged with • • • the execution of all treaties and 
conventions entered into by the above mentioned republics 
with foreign states which shall remain in force in the 
territories of the respective republics.54 
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h ·1 h . . 55 d M h . However, w 1 e t e const1tut1on empowere oscow to assume t e 1nter-
national obligations incurred by the republics and explicitly gave it 
the power to represent the union in international relations, its provi-
sions neither denied these powers to the republics nor defined them as 
1 . 1 . h. h . . d. . f h u . 56 exc us1ve y w1t 1n t e Jurls 1ct1on o t e n1on government. As 
Aspaturian notes in this regard, "the constitutional decentralization of 
foreign affairs in the Soviet system is ingeniously devised to preclude 
any legal or political conflict between formal devolution and de facto 
centralization of control. The enhanced diplomatic flexibility of the 
Soviet Union is thus ensured without at the same time disturbing the 
internal power equilibrium between Moscow and the border republics."57 
Th h . d h d h f h 58 h d . e t 1r p ase covere t e years o t e purges to t e a opt1on 
of the 1944 amendments to the constitution. During this period, the 
republics were effectively deprived of all participation in the admin-
istration of Soviet foreign relations. 
The 1944 amendments to the Soviet constitution mark the beginning 
of what Aspaturian has identified as the fourth phase in the role of 
the Union Republics in Soviet foreign relations. These amendments 
institute a permissive authority for the Union to delegate limited 
diplomatic functions to the republics, but it is free to grant or with-
h ld h . d" . 59 o t ese powers at 1ts 1scret1on. 
The revised constitution establishes a system of dual jurisdiction 
and shared sovereignty. The effect of the amendments is a partial 
recovery by the republics of powers which they voluntarily entrusted to 
the Union in 1923 and appears to be an expansion of their sovereign 
h . . h h f . . 1 1 . 60 aut or1ty 1nto t e sp ere o 1nternat1ona re at1ons. The amendments 
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appear to indicate a return to the first phase in the external role of 
the Union republics, but in fact the Soviet treaty process indicates 
otherwise. Soviet constitutional law recognizes two general categories 
of international agreements, treaties requiring formal ratification by 
the supreme organs of state power (the Supreme Soviet or its Presidium, 
usually the latter), and international agreements requiring only confir-
mation by the Council of Mlnisters. Whereas Article 14 (a) of the 
constitution gives the Union the power of "conclusion, ratification, 
and denunciation of treaties" of the USSR, Article 18 (a) limits the 
republics to concluding agreements with foreign states and makes no 
mention of treaties or of the ratification and denunciation of inter-
. 1 61 nat1ona compacts. A further indication of the plenary powers of the 
Union lies in the fact that all agreements signed by the republics with 
foreign states are subject to "nullification, disavowal or denunciation 
62 by the Union government." 
4. United States 
The historical factors which gave rise to firm establishment of 
the central government as supreme in the foreign affairs of the United 
States form a classic argument against the diffusion of the foreign 
affairs power. Prior to federation violations of agreements by indi-
vidual states were causing jealousy and disharmony among them. Further-
more, foreign nations were developing a practice of favoring one compo-
nent state over another, particularly in the commercial field. It was 
felt, according to Hendry, that the central government must have control 
of the treaty performing power to prevent external forces from invading 
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national rights and disturbing the national tranquility. "This idea 
pervaded the making of the new Constitution and the setting up of the 
63 
central government as supreme in both aspects of the treaty process." 
The constitutional convention in 1787 gave to the executive the 
right to enter into treaties on the advice and consent of two-thirds of 
64 the senators present. As well, treaties were effectively defined as 
a part of the law of the land under Article 6, Section 2, which states, 
"this constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be 
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, 
anything in the constitution or laws of any state notwithstanding." 
The pre-eminence of the central government is further reinforced 
in Article 1, Section 1, where it states in part that "no state shall 
enter into any treaty or alliance or confederation." As well, Article 
1, Section 3, holds that "no state shall, without the consent of 
congress • • enter into any agreement or compact with another state 
or with a foreign power." There is little doubt that the realm of the 
formal treaty is firmly controlled by the central government; "the 
people of the United States by the Constitution of 1787, vested the 
whole treaty-making power in the national government. • • The treaty-
making power is not distributed; it is vested all in the national 
65 government; no part of it is vested in or reserved to the states." 
There is argument, according to Hendry, that other types of instru-
ments, such as commercial agreements, are permissable with the consent 
66 
of congress, and that some scope exists for individual states to 
enter into agreements or compacts of a non-political nature. The 
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proceedings of the United States Congress are instructive here: "The 
terms 'compact and agreement' ••• do not apply to every possible 
compact or agreement • • • but the prohibition is directed to the 
formation of any combination tending to increase of political power in 
the states which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy 
of the United States. The terms cover all stipulations affecting the 
conduct or claims of states, whether verbal or written, formal or 
67 informal, positive or implied, with each other or with foreign powers." 
It would appear that while the states have some scope in foreign 
relations, its parameters are tightly defined. 
E. International Law and the Participation of 
States Members of a Federal Union in 
International Relations 
The position of international law on the question of the role of 
"dependent entities" in international relations is unclear. Lissitzyn 
has argued that the history of both private and official attempts to 
codify or restate the law of treaties lends little or no support to the 
view that territorial entities other than independent states cannot, in 
principle, have treaty-making capacity or be party to treaties, but "it 
reveals much uncertainty, much controversy, and some confusion as to 
the role of dependent entities in treaty relations and the modalities 
of this role." 68 Such a question necessarily involves the issues of 
'personality' and 'capacity.' Without appearing to 'beg the question,' 
it is important to point out that Lissitzyn has argued elsewhere that 
"it may indeed be doubted that international law contains any objective 
. . f . . 1 1" k" . " 69 cr1ter1a o 1nternat1ona persona 1ty or treaty-ma 1ng capac1ty. 
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There are those who would disagree however. Some agreement exists 
that only fully independent, sovereign states, and certain international 
pqblic organizations may truly be 'international persons.' These 
W~iters would argue that while the federation as a whole possesses 
i~ternational personality, the central government alone exercises its 
a~tributes. 70 A number of criteria must be satisfied for a state to be 
a~ international person. Oppenheim argues that "only external sover-
etgnty must be taken into account for the determination of international 
P~rsonality." 71 But he admits that where a partial international 
competence is retained by (the member states of a federation), they 
e~joy a corresponding external sovereignty and are, to that extent, 
i~ternational subjects. 72 Bernier cites as an essential condition of 
the international personality of member states, the practice of indi-
vtdual recognition by states which are held to be sovereign. 73 He 
argues further that constitutional provisions alone are not enough to 
gcant international status to member states of federations. 
On the other hand, there is the view held by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, 
wbo, in his capacity as third special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, 
s t ated in 1958, that "there is no doubt that the component states of a 
f~deral union are not states in the international sense of the term and 
d~ not possess any international personality apart from that of the 
federal union to which they belong." 74 Even here, however, Fitzmaurice 
does not deny that the member units of a federation may possess some 
degree of international personality. 
There appears to be general agreement that states members of 
federal unions may possess a limited international personality if the 
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constitution allows for the exercise of external sovereignty and if 
sovereign states are prepared to deal with them. Similarly, the capa-
city of member states in international relations derives from the federal 
constitution. 75 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht holds that an essential condi-
tion of the validity of agreements concluded by states members of a 
federation is the "conferment by the constitutional law of the federal 
states ••• of the treaty-making capacity upon their member states." 76 
Where this is so, the member state exercises only a delegated power and 
is held to act as an agent of the federal government. 
A similar view was presented in the First Report on the Law of 
Treaties in 1962 by Sir Humphrey Waldeck. In a proposed article for 
the law of treaties, Waldeck provided that members of federations may 
have the capacity to enter into treaties if the constitution so allows: 
"the constituent state normally exercises this power in the capacity 
only of an organ of the federal state or union 1177 The proposed 
article further stated that: 
International capacity to be a party to treaties may 
however, be possessed by a constituent state of a feder-
ation or union, upon which the power to enter into agree-
ments directly with foreign states has been conferred by 
the Constitution: 
1. If it is a member of the United Nations or 
2. If it is recognized by the federal state or union and 
by the other contracting state or states to possess an 
international personality of its own.78 
Efforts to codify international law have attempted to place in the 
law of treaties some determination of the capacity of member units of 
federations to engage in the treaty process. At the First Session of 
the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties in 1968, no speaker denied 
that members of federal unions can possess treaty-making capacity, "but 
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there was controversy over the legal basis of such capacity and of the 
limitations upon it (constitutional law, international law, or both), 
over the formulation of the clause, and over the desirability of making 
express provision for members of federal unions in a convention otherwise 
79 limited in scope to agreements between 'states' " Similarly, the 
Harvard Research in International Law and the Restatement of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States published by the American Law Insti-
tute in 1965 called into question the notion that independence was a 
prerequisite in the determination of "capacity."80 The 1969 Plenary 
Session of the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties had before it 
for consideration a draft article on treaty capacity for federal member 
units which stated: 
States members of a federal union may possess a capacity 
to conclude treaties if such capacity is admitted by the 
federal constitution and within the limits there laid 
down.81 
This article was not retained by the Conference in the final draft of 
the Vienna Convention due to opposition from a number of states, 
including Canada, despite the fact that "general international law 
recognizes • the competence of states • • • to endow political 
subdivisions ••• with a limited capacity to enter into relations 
d 1 1 1182 governe by internationa aw. In effect, lack of consensus led to 
the issue being shelved, but the possibility of its being resurrected 
remains. 
Despite the failure of formal attempts to recognize the role of 
dependent entities in international law, practice and "general inter-
national law" indicates some consensus, however vaguely defined. States 
of the United States, Canadian provinces, German Lander, Swiss cantons, 
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and the Union Republics of the USSR have all shown at least a de facto 
international role. The legal status of the agreements concluded by 
these entities is as unclear as their capacity to conclude such agree-
ments. Certain criteria have evolved, however. There is a general 
consensus that "states can enter into agreements with other states that 
are governed not by the rules of public international law but by the 
national law of one of the parties."83 This notion finds support in 
the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 
Serbian Loans Case, where the majority decision held that "any contract 
which is not a contract between states in their capacity as subjects of 
international law is based on the municipal law of some country."84 
Similarly, R. J. Delisle has argued that such agreements are in fact 
contracts "whose interpretation and enforcement are governed by private 
international law."85 
Whether or not these agreements are binding and the source of 
responsibility for their conduct,is somewhat unclear. Lissitzyn argues 
that "an agreement between a state of the United States and a foreign 
entity, if it purports to create rights and obligations, is legally 
binding."86 There is certainly a presumption that this is so, particu-
larly since such agreements are governed, if not by public international 
law, then by the municipal law of one of the parties. Yet, many of the 
agreements between, for example, states of the United States and Canadian 
provinces are held to be "informal administrative arrangements because 
they create understandings rather than legal obligations."87 Luigi di 
Marzo, in a study of the legal status of such agreements, concludes 
that: 
Unlike the Swiss canton and German Lander agreements which 
say they have the force of law and quite often have clear 
articles setting up machinery for the settlement of dis-
putes, the agreements of the American states and Canadian 
provinces seldom speak of legal obligations and virtually 
none contain clauses for the settlement of disputes.88 
Accordingly, the official Canadian view is that agreements or 
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arrangements concluded by provinces with foreign entities fall into one 
of three categories: informal arrangements of a non-binding character; 
arrangements of a contractual nature governed by municipal law; and 
arrangements authorized by the Canadian government or Parliament, which 
are regarded as internationally binding on Canada as a whole, rather 
h h . 1 . 89 t an on t e part1cu ar prov1nces. It follows from this position that 
the federal government alone has the power to terminate, with inter-
national effect, the agreements of the provinces with foreign entities. 
In this regard, the provinces are probably legally powerless without 
90 the implied or express consent of the federal government. 
It must be noted here that there appears to be some confusion in 
the literature in the use of the term 'treaty,' 'compact' and 'agree-
ment. ' In the constitutions of the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
USSR, Switzerland and the United States, both terms appear to apply to 
signed documents at the executive level which create rights and duties 
of an international nature. The Canadian government has attempted to 
create classes of agreements, only some of which fit the above definition 
and could properly be called "treaties." From the Canadian government's 
point of view an agreement between Newfoundland Hydro and the State of 
New York for the sale of hydroelectric power is a contract, despite the 
fact that Newfoundland Hydro is a Crown corporation of the Province of 
Newfoundland. On the other hand, a similar agreement involving an arm 
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of a German Lander and a Swiss canton may be termed a 'treaty' under 
the constitutions of Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The question of responsibility remains. As accepted sovereign 
subjects of international law, federal states must answer for the acts 
or omissions of their component units in the same way as if they were 
unitary states. However, when the member states of federations are 
allowed to deal separately with foreign powers and undertake inter-
national obligations in their own name, they will normally be held 
responsible for the fulfillment of these obligations. If, by virtue of 
the constitution, the federal government retains a limited control over 
the international dealings of its component units, and this is the case 
in the majority of examples, then it must answer indirectly for their 
acts or omissions contrary to international law. In this instance, some 
variety of shared liability would apply. In the event that member 
states act in complete independence of federal authorities, and this 
fact is known to the other state or states concerned, responsibility 
rests entirely with the contracting member state. If, in concluding 
agreements with foreign states, member states exceed their competence, 
the federal government may denounce the agreement and it becomes null 
and void. On the other hand, if such an agreement is regarded by the 
federal government as valid, and the other contracting party has no 
objection, then the agreement may remain in force with the federal 
government and the member state or states involved, responsible for its 
execution. 91 This notion is in keeping with the idea that dominant 
states possess the power in international law to terminate or modify 
the treaty obligations of their subordinate entities by entering into 
. d. . . h h h . 92 overr1 1ng treat1es w1t t e ot er part1es. 
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The same reasoning applies in the question of immunity. From an 
international law point of view, only the federal state is sovereign; 
therefore the member states of a federation cannot claim immunity as 
sovereign entities before a foreign court. However, if a federal 
constitution grants limited international competence to its member 
states and they are allowed to deal on a basis of equality with foreign 
powers, and further, if such powers agree to deal with these member 
states, then they would appear to be entitled to immunity. 93 
From this discussion it is evident that the international law 
position on the question of the role of member units of federal states 
in treaty-making in particular, and in international relations in 
general, is unclear. In the case of Canadian provinces, the situation 
is perhaps even more obscure since a significant portion of the Canadian 
constitution is unwritten and we have seen that international law may 
recognize even a partial international personality only if such is 
d . db h 1. bl . . 94 a m1tte y t e app 1ca e const1tut1on. R. J. Delisle has argued 
that in the face of constitutional silence as to authority over foreign 
affairs, "there is a presumption in international law that the regional 
governments have no such power, i.e., the central government is to be 
deemed to have full and exclusive treaty-making power." 95 This is a 
valid point in the Canadian context, but it unfortunately ignores the 
fact that Canadian provinces have been parties to international agree-
ments in a process very similar to that which eventually resulted in 
the attainment of full independence by a number of states, Canada 
included. Di Marzo, for example, has stated that the provinces could, 
through their conclusion of various transborder agreements, have acquired 
96 
a de facto agreement making power. Similarly, Lissitzyn notes that 
the older British dominions, Southern Rhodesia, the Ukrainian and 
Byelorussian SSR's, the Phillippine Commonwealth and others, "all 
developed their treaty-making capacity through the very process of 
97 
entering into international agreements." 
F. Conclusion 
The evidence of international law and practice and state practice 
indicates that overall responsibility for the conduct of external 
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affairs as regards treaties rests with the central government. As K. C. 
Wheare has stated: 
Although there are differences in detail ••• there is 
found everywhere a recognition of the principle that the 
exclusive control, actually or potentially, of relations 
with foreign states rests with the government of the whole 
country.98 
Whatever the intentions of the fathers of Confederation, it is submitted 
that those intentions have little relevance to contemporary global 
politics. The fact remains, however, that a federal union's main 
purpose is to present itself on the international scene as possessing 
"the power and the will to speak on behalf of its component units with 
. 1 1 . . . 1199 one s1ng e eg1t1mate vo1ce. In light of this approach, it is 
probably anti-climatic to argue the respective merits of the federal 
and provincial positions on the question. However, some points may be 
made. 
At present, on the basis of the Labor Conventions decision in 1937, 
the federal government may pursue the treaty process largely immune from 
provincial interference in areas of its exclusive legislative compe-
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tence~ while, in areas of provincial legislative competence, the imple-
mentation of treaties touching on such subject matter must await the 
pleasure of the provinces. This situation, however, has been adapted 
to allow the provinces somewhat more freedom than the Privy Council 
intended, while maintaining federal control. The methods employed have 
been designed to give international validity to agreements between 
provinces and foreign states. In a position paper released in 1968, 
titled "Federalism and International Relations," the federal government 
defined these methods as firstly~ 'indemnity agreements.' Under such a 
scheme, the federal government enters into an agreement with the govern-
ment of a foreign state on a matter of interest to a province. The 
province agrees to provide the necessary legislative authority to carry 
out the agreement and also agrees to indemnify the federal government 
in the event of provincial default. Secondly, 'ad hoc covering agree-
ments' involve an exchange of notes between the federal government and 
a foreign state which gives assent to arrangements between a province 
and the foreign state. In the opinion of the federal government, the 
exchange of notes gives international legal effect to the arrangements 
between the province and the foreign entity but does not involve the 
province itself acquiring international rights or accepting international 
obligations. Thirdly, 'general framework agreements' are similar to 
the ad hoc variety except that their scope is much greater. Such agree-
ments would allow for future arrangements between a province and a 
foreign state without further federal government involvement. 100 Such 
methods, either in use or contemplated, allow the provinces some scope 
in international affairs, but always under federal supervision. Indeed, 
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this concern with control by the federal government has been criticized 
as part of a general trend in federal-provincial relations. McWhinney, 
for example, has observed, 
• it may be suggested that the federal government has 
tended at times to be overly concerned with questions of 
symbols and abstract ideology and indeed of political 
'face,' at the expense of concrete problem-solving; and 
that it has, on the whole, given too much stress to issues 
of constitutional power in the abstract, seeking to rest 
on the old fashioned notion of a federal-provincial con-
stitutional dichotomy with watertight compartments of 
power, at the expense of a more pluralistic, co-operative 
approach to decision-making in the complex federal society 
of today.lOl 
McWhinney's comments on this theme can be applied as well to provincial 
appeals to the practice of Switzerland and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, in seeking support for a provincial role in Canadian treaty-
making. In his opinion, citation of these examples as support often 
rests on the 'law-in-books' of abstract constitutional texts, without 
regard to the 'law-in-action. ,lOZ This, in fact, is a telling criticism 
of that aspect of the provincial position since we have seen the extent 
of federal control of the international activity of these member units, 
even where such rights are entrenched in constitutional provisions. 
Finally, arguments based in part on the practice of other federal 
states may be misleading for another reason, a reason which has broad 
implications in the Canadian context. Thomas Levy has suggested that 
Canada may be viewed as unique among the world's federations. Levy 
argues that Canada is characterized to a marked degree by territorially 
based ethnic, linguistic and religious cleavages, reinforced by regional 
divergences of economic interest, and by the lack of a deeply rooted 
political culture. "These cleavages suggest that the ways in which the 
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provinces are involved in external affairs may differ considerably from 
those found in other federations." 103 Added to this, is the fact that 
Canadian external relations have developed on an ad hoc, extra-consti-
tutional, empirical basis. There is no operative constitutional provi-
sion specifying the role of either the federal or provincial governments 
in foreign affairs and the few formal principles that do apply have 
evolved largely by precedent and judicial determination. 
The linguistic and cultural factors present primarily in the 
province of Quebec and the economic factors present in all provinces 
combine with other factors to make Canada a unique case. It is this 
uniqueness and its manifestations in provincial international activity, 
which we will now pursue. 
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CHAPTER II 
PROVINCIAL INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY 
Introduction 
Provincial international activity assumes a variety of forms and 
complexity which tends to belie the emphasis placed on the legal and 
constitutional aspects of the issue by contemporary and historical 
analysts. Relationships between Canadian provinces and foreign entities 
are a relatively new unit of analysis 1 and the literature is demonstrably 
biased in favor of those interactions between provinces and American 
states. Undoubtedly this shortcoming will be remedied as the attention 
of students of the subject becomes more focused. 
From another perspective it may be premature to apply the adjective 
"biased" since the possibility exists that relationships between Canadian 
provinces and American states form the majority of provincial inter-
. 1 . . 2 natlona actlvlty. Historical, cultural, social and economic linkages, 
plus the existence of a common border would lend support to this hypo-
thesis. 
Aside from these factors, which may be specific explanatory vari-
ables of province-state interaction, questions remain as to provincial 
motivation, method and intent. An examination of recent work in this 
field serves to provide some answers. 
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A. The Nature of Provincial International Involvement: 
TransDorder Considerations 
Perhaps the most comprehensive examination of provincial interaction 
with American states was commissioned by the United States State Depart-
3 
ment and conducted by Roger Swanson. The emphasis in this study was 
on interactions between Canadian provinces and American statee, as 
reported by American state officials. Swanson states that, "the Canadian 
Federal Government was informed of the project, and invited by the 
author to participate. Circumstances precluded the Canadian government 
from doing so."4 On this basis, Swanson's data should be treated with 
some caution. 
Despite this caveat, Swanson's findings are remarkable in revealing 
the nature and extent of province-state interaction. For this reason, 
we shall examine his study in some detail. 
Swanson refers to province-state interaction as 'subnationalism,' 
the "interactions and roles of sublevel governmental units of nations."5 
He defines a state-provincial interaction as "those currently operative 
processes in which there is direct communication between state and 
provincial officials on an ongoing basis."6 Thus, of a total of 1,057 
interactions, 766 met these definitional parameters and form the basis 
of Swanson's analysis. 
Swanson delineated the discovered interactions into a typology 
consisting of agreements, understandings and arrangements. An agreement 
is the most formal type of interaction defined as a jointly signed 
7 document setting forth regularized interactive procedures. Such an 
interaction could occur between state governors and provincial premiers 
47 
as, for example, the June 1973 Curtis-Hatfield joint agreement between 
Maine and New Brunswick "to maintain and foster close cooperation in 
8 
all relevant areas of concern." Less formal is an understanding, 
consisting of correspondence, resolutions, communiques, or memoranda, 
not jointly signed, setting forth regularized interactive procedures. 
An example of correspondence is the August/December 1966 exchange of 
letters between an official of Louisiana's Department of Public Safety 
and Ontario's Department of Transport concerning reciprocity on exemp-
tion from registration of motor vehicles and trailers. An example of a 
resolution is the August 1973 Resolution of the New England Governors-
Eastern Canadian Premiers9 for the "development of joint energy policies" 
through the New England-Eastern Canadian Energy Advisory Committee. An 
example of a communique is the May 1972 Joint Communique of Maine's 
Governor and Quebec's Deputy premier setting forth an understanding 
between Maine and Quebec for cooperation in broadcasting and other areas. 
Finally, an example of memoranda is the January 1974 Illinois Adminis-
trative Order establishing an understanding between the Illinois Depart-
ment of Conservation and Ontario for cooperative fishery management in 
accordance with the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission. 10 In cases where 
an interaction occurred, but there was no reported jointly signed docu-
ment, nor any jointly signed correspondence, resolutions communiques or 
memoranda, it was entered in Swanson's typology as an arrangement, 
defined as "any other written or verbal articulation of a regularized 
interactive procedure." An example of such an interaction is the 
arrangement between New York's Department of Environmental Conservation 
and Ontario's Ministry of the Environment "to discuss mutual air pollu-
tion problems through the holding of periodic informal meetings." 11 
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Of the 766 interactions considered by the Swanson study forty-four 
or 5.7 percent were agreements, the most formal and potentially the most 
highly politicized form of interaction. One hundred eighty-one or 23.6 
percent were understandings and the majority, 541 or 70.6 percent were 
the least formal type of interaction, namely arrangements. On this 
basis, Swanson concludes that state-provincial interaction "is largely 
an informal affair." 12 
Swanson identified eleven functional categories or issue areas in 
which state-provincial interaction took place. The level of activity 
in each category is displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Percentage of Total Interactions of Each Functional 
Category Identified by Swanson 
Category 
Transportation 
Natural Resources 
Commerce & Industry 
Human Services 
Environmental Protection 
Educational & Cultural 
Energy 
Public Safety 
Agriculture 
Unclassified 
Mllitary & Civil Defense 
Total* 
% of Total Interactions 
27.5% 
19.5% 
10.4% 
9.9% 
8.5% 
5. 7% 
4.7% 
4.7% 
3.5% 
3.4% 
2.1% 
99.9% 
*Note: Figures do not total 100% due to rounding. 
Source: Adapted from Swanson, Roger Frank, State/Provincial 
Interaction (Washington: The CANUS Research Institute, 
1974) 
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Arrangements have been concluded in all functional categories, while 
understandings were not reported in the areas of agriculture, environ-
mental protection, and public safety. Agreements, the most formal type 
of interaction, were absent in the categories of agriculture, educational 
and cultural, human services, natural resources and public safety. In 
terms of the total number of interactions, most, 27.5 percent, occurred 
in the functional category of transportation. An example is an under-
standing between Connecticut and Nova Scotia concerning "the operation 
of motor vehicles by non-resident students," concluded in an exchange 
of letters in July/August 1971. 13 Issues concerning natural resources 
accounted for 19.5 percent of all interactions. An example here is an 
arrangement between Maine and New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Quebec on 
shellfish purification and regulations where the three Canadian provinces 
consulted with the state of Maine in establishing quality control 
systems for shellfish. 14 Commerce and industry accounted for 10.4 
percent of all interactions, as for example, an arrangement between 
Alaska and British Columbia involving correspondence on "matters of 
1 • . • d 1 • 1115 mutua lnterest concernlng economlc eve opment proJects. 
Howard Leeson, in a survey and analysis of the transborder contacts 
16 
of Alberta and Saskatchewan, used functional categories and a typology 
similar to that employed by Swanson. Interactions were classified as 
either agreements, that is, any interaction undertaken in writing and 
either jointly signed or agreed to by correspondence; or arrangements, 
defined as any interactive procedure not necessarily involving signed 
documents or correspondence which has the agreement of all parties. 17 
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Leeson employed five functional categories: economic (including 
energy and natural resources); environmental, human services (including 
transportation and social welfare); political, defined as trips, visits, 
etc., and other executive or legislative contacts between state and 
provincial officials; and a general category, including all contacts 
. 1 d d d h .f. h d. 18 not 1nc u e un er t ese spec1 1c ea 1ngs. 
Where Swanson did not include in his analysis, interactions which 
· 
19 L d . f h d f f were not ongo1ng, eeson oes, 1n a treatment o t e ata or requency 
of interaction. Thus, an interaction was defined as 'regular' if it 
occurred with regularity, such as annual conferences or regular committee 
meetings. Interactions were typed as 'occasional' if they happened more 
than once but had no fixed pattern of occurrence. Finally, an inter-
action was defined as 'unique' if it was necessitated by a particular 
20 
event which did not carry with it the necessity for any future contact. 
The final element in Leeson's typology was a classification of the data 
by actor role. Thus interactions which did not involve the Canadian 
federal government, but which may or may not have involved the American 
federal government, were classified as 'province-state.' Interactions 
involving the Canadian federal government and possibly the American 
federal government were classified as 'province-Canadian Government-
21 
state.' 
Leeson found a total of 113 interactions, of which 50 were agree-
ments and 63 arrangements. This result is at variance with Swanson's 
findings that only 44 of a total of 776 interactions were the more 
formal agreement. Leeson notes, however, that most of the agreements 
are reciprocal motor vehicle licensing arrangements, heavily concentrated 
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in the transportation category. Thus the more formal type of inter-
. h d . "d f . . 22 act1on as not occurre 1n a w1 e range o act1v1ty. In terms of 
frequency of interaction, over half (54 percent) of the contacts were 
regular in nature, while 31 percent were occasional and 11 percent 
unique. The most active functional category was human services with 
51.3 percent of all interactions. Taken together with the economic 
category, these two issue areas accounted for over 90 percent of all 
interactions. Interestingly, when actor role was considered, only 15 
or 13 percent of all interactions involved the Canadian federal govern-
ment. 
Another study of province-state transborder relations, from the 
Canadian perspective, was conducted by Richard H. Leach, Donald E. 
Walker and Thomas Allen Levy in 1973. 23 This study was, in effect, a 
combination of two research methods: a national mail survey by Leach 
and Walker, and a survey based on structured interviews by Levy. The 
classificatory system developed for this study examined the data for 
degree of formality and function. Formal interactions were defined as 
those embodied in some kind of written agreement, specifically calling 
for cooperation between Canadian provincial government departments and 
American state agencies. Informal relations were those interactions 
which consist of exchanges of information on an occasional basis. 24 
The functional classification consists of five categories. Firstly, 
regulatory relations are those examples of cooperation which, by mutual 
agreement, legally affect the conduct of some form of activity. An 
example is the practice of Canadian provinces and American states indi-
vidually signing reciprocity agreements regarding the standards applic-
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able to international common carriers licensed in their own jurisdictions. 
Secondly, third-party relations are interactions which involve the 
national government of either of the subnational actors participating. 
Quebec, for example, is a member of the Shore Party Subcommittee of the 
International Joint Commission on which both the Canadians and the 
American Federal Government sit. Thirdly, protective/environmental 
relations involve the preservation of some facet of ecology. In this 
regard, provinces and states have engaged in agreements which arrange 
protection against forest fires and sponsor anti-pollution programs. 
Fourthly, public works interactions focus on road and bridge design as 
well as maintenance of transportation facilities crossing the interna-
tional boundary. For example, Maine and New Brunswick have collaborated 
in the building of a tourist information centre on the Maine-New Bruns-
wick border. The fifth and final category is that of public services, 
involving interactions in such areas as welfare, consumer protection, 
municipal development, tax administration, adoption procedures, labor 
relations, education, civil defense and public health. 25 
Leach et al. 
--
reported a total of 170 interactions for all ten 
provinces with 95 or 55.9 percent being formal and 75 or 44.1 percent 
b . . f 1 26 e1ng 1n orma • In view of the number of interactions reported by 
Swanson and Leeson, this study is seriously incomplete. However, Leach 
and his colleagues raise an important issue in this regard, "In view of 
the highly compartmentalized nature of provincial bureaucracies and the 
scant attention given by them to collection of data regarding informal 
contacts with American states, it is certain that the number of informal 
27 links is greater than the number portrayed here." 
The most active areas of interaction as reported by Leach ~ al. 
were public service (40.2 percent) and protective/environmental (28 
28 percent). 
Another study of significance to this discussion of the nature of 
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. . 1 . . 1 . . . h d d b J h 29 On prov1nc1a 1nternat1ona act1v1ty 1s t at con ucte y o annson. 
the basis of an elaborate typology, Johannsen identified 649 interac-
tions between British Columbia and American states. The typology 
employed identified interactions as occurring at three levels of author-
ity, bureaucratic, ministerial and premier, within two fields, "provin-
cial responsibility," or activities within the constitutional jurisdic-
tion of the province, and "provincial responsibility extended," or 
activities which may go beyond a literal interpretation of constitutional 
authority. Finally, the nature of interactions was considered on the 
basis of five categories. 
The lowest order of interaction, and the most extensive according 
to Johannsen, were "informational interactions." These contacts 
involved information flows between individuals employed by governments, 
through membership in professional organizations, as well as data 
exchanges between governments at an informal level. "Joint activities" 
are the next order of interaction, representing low-level understandings 
which do not result from written agreements, in a range from regular 
exchanges of data to basic understandings calling for common responses 
to particular events. An interaction is typed as a "joint agreement" 
if it is characterized by a written agreement which calls for some kind 
of coordination of activity. Interactions defined as "joint memberships" 
result from actor membership on a task-oriented body which has been 
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established by governments. At this level of interaction, a formalized 
structure of some kind has been established, either by agreement between 
the two federal governments or in the form of committees established by 
local governments. Finally, the most significant provincial government 
involvement with foreign governments is the category of interaction 
labelled "treaty involvement." This level includes all operations of a 
formal nature in the international sector. Examples of this type of 
involvement are the operation of provincial offices abroad and member-
ship on Canadian delegations which are charged with formulating an 
. . 1 30 1nternat1ona agreement. 
To summarize Johannsen's findings, the most active authority is 
the bureaucratic actor, accounting for 527 interactions of a total of 
649. The bulk of these are accounted for by information, joint activi-
ties, and joint agreements. A total of 68 interactions for the bureau-
cratic actor involved treaties, and of these, 40 occurred in areas 
outside provincial jurisdiction. The ministerial level of authority 
had the bulk of interactions in the form of joint activities, but with 
a significant number, 41, again outside provincial jurisdiction. Acti-
vity at the level of premier occurred in joint activities with four 
. . k. 1 . d . . 1 h . 31 1nteract1ons ta 1ng p ace outs1 e prov1nc1a aut or1ty. Overall, 
13.1 percent of the interactions were classified as provincial responsi-
bility extended, and according to Johannsen, the incidence is most 
marked at the political levels of authority, "while the bureaucratic 
actor was involved in the most raw numbers, the political level accounted 
for 52.9 -percent of the interactions considered "provincial responsi-
bility extended."32 
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B. Informal vs. Formal Modes of Interaction 
The typologies employed by these studies all incorporate some 
notion of the formality and informality of the interactions with which 
they deal. In each case, the most formal interactions are those char-
acterized by the existence of a jointly signed document and with the 
33 
exception of one study, formed a minority of total interactions. 
Swanson, for example, found that of 766 interactions, only 44 were 
agreements, the most formal mode of interaction. Less formal under-
standings comprised 181 interactions, while the bulk of the reported 
interactions, 541, were arrangements, the least formal method of contact. 
Why this is so is unclear. Swanson speculates that the distribution 
and prevalence of types of interaction appear to be consistent with a 
developmental sequence in which "a state begins with interactions in 
the form of arrangements and proceeds over time to formalize these 
arrangements or to conclude other understandings and agreements on this 
base." 34 Swanson also suggests that "the types of interaction could 
also be dependent upon those operative constitutional parameters which 
1 . f . . .. 35 app y to glven areas o lnteractlon. 
This conclusion finds support in Leeson's study. Leeson found a 
preponderance of informal interactions, and agreements that did exist 
were not signed in a wide variety of activities. Less formal interac-
tions were more evenly distributed however; "this would appear to indi-
cate that Alberta/Saskatchewan and state governments are more willing 
to enter into informal arrangements on a wide variety of subjects than 
they are to formalize such arrangements. 
th . . . b . 1 .. 36 elr posltlon as su natlona actors. 
This is understandable given 
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Similarly, Johannsen concludes that there is little use of formal 
written documents, but a strong tendency towards making "understandings" 
with other local governments. He states that "in part, this is because 
of constitutional prohibitions on this form of activity; in part, it is 
due to the level of authority involved. u37 
It is informative to examine "how" states and provinces interact, 
in other words, the mechanisms through which interaction takes place. 
38 Roger Swanson has identified several of these mechanisms. Bureau-
cratic ad hoc meetings are one mode of contact. State and provincial 
officials are often involved in similar areas of concern. Where this 
is the case, it is not unusual that these officials should meet for an 
exchange of information, discussion of common problems and, if appro-
priate, the development of joint projects and programs. Another method 
of contact involves the direct representation of states in Canadian 
provinces, usually accomplished through the vehicle of public relations 
firms, rather than an official presence. The same is true of provincial 
39 
representation in American states, although provincial offices abroad 
tend to maintain a direct presence. In both cases, however, the mode 
of contact indicates a functional approach, designed to promote trade 
and tourism and the exchange of economic development. Another mechanism 
through which state-provincial contact is achieved is joint organiza-
tions, again designed to deal with functional issues, as, for example, 
the New England-Eastern Canadian Provinces Energy Advisory Committee. 
Similarly, Canadian provinces participate in American Interstate 
Compacts as the Uniform Vehicle Registration Proration. Contact may be 
facilitated as well through professional associations of which state 
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d . . 1 ff .. 1 b 40 an prov1nc1a o 1c1a s are mem ers. Finally, contact between states 
and provinces is achieved through the Canadian and American federal 
governments. In many of these cases, for example, the International 
Joint Commission, provinces and states have direct representation. 41 
The consensus of the literature in this area is that state-provin-
cial interaction is primarily informal in nature. Moreover, the mech-
anisms by and through which states and provinces interact, indicate a 
functional orientation which poses no threat at this time, to the 
sovereign and pre-eminent powers of their respective federal governments. 
C. Explanatory Variables of State-Provincial Interaction 
At a general level, a number of factors have been suggested as 
reasons for transborder relations. Thomas Levy described the causes of 
state-provincial interaction as a "felt need to collaborate in policy 
areas in which they possess legislative authority, because jurisdictional 
parameters are not clear, or because their respective national govern-
ments choose either not to exercise their own authority or to delegate 
42 power to the regional governments." Equally, Roger Swanson has 
suggested a number of variables including contiguity and geographical 
distance between states and provinces, the size of states and provinces 
in terms of population and economic base, the size of the state and 
provincial governments and their attendent capacity and resources for 
undertaking transborder interactions, and the cultural distribution of 
h 1 . 43 t e popu at1on. A more specific, regional perspective, according to 
Leeson, sees historical settlement and immigration patterns, economic 
development, and service needs generated from geographical proximity, 
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. f 44 as operat1ve actors. In his study of British Columbia's relations 
with the United States, Johannson identified geography, constitutional 
authority, ceremonial good-will visits and specific issues as causal 
factors. More particularly, however, Johannson states that, "the degree 
of interaction undertaken by the provincial government on a given 
subject will be determined primarily by the perceived needs and interests 
of the province, rather than by the constitutional authority to become 
involved in the international ramifications of a particular subject."45 
A factor common to the findings of all these authors is the role 
of geographical proximity as a causal factor in state-provincial inter-
action. Swanson found that 62 percent of all interactions between 
provinces and states were accounted for by states and provinces with 
. b d 46 cont1guous or ers. Conversely, Leeson found that only 23 percent of 
Alberta/Saskatchewan interactions were with border states. More suppor-
tive of Swanson's figures were the findings of Johannson, who determined 
that almost 63 percent of British Columbia's interactions, for all 
levels of authority, were with bordering United States states. 47 
It would appear that the international boundary does not constitute 
a barrier to relations between Canadian provinces and American states 
and that the existence of common borders is an important factor in these 
relations. In the absence of comparative data to the contrary, there 
are grounds for viewing state-provincial interaction as unique. Canada 
and the United States are both federal states with many interests in 
common. The border between the two countries has been peaceful for over 
150 years. Economic links abound. Canadian and American politicians 
still speak of a special relationship between the two countries. For 
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these reasons, provincial interaction with states or subunits of states 
other than the United States, must be considered before any definitive 
conclusions may be drawn. 
While it appears that contiguity is an important factor in provin-
cial international activity, the role of business and economics, and 
particularly the Canadian economic system is given less emphasis. 
It is a well-established truism that the Canadian economy has 
historically been based on an image of Canadians as "hewers of wood and 
drawers of water." Canada exports its natural resources, in the main, 
in raw and semi-processed states, and, in turn, imports manufactured 
products. In general, Canada has a raw resource-based economy. Secondary 
manufacturing is concentrated in central Canada, Ontario and Quebec. 
Thus, in terms of interregional trade, Atlantic and Western Canada must 
pay the costs of high tariff-protected industrial goods produced in 
central Canada, while engaged in considerably less protected competition 
on world markets for the disposal of their natural products. In addi-
tion, the industrialized areas of central Canada have tended to siphon 
off labor from the peripheral parts of the country because of the 
latter's inability to foster secondary manufacturing. For these reasons, 
the peripheral provinces have been consistent advocates of free trade, 
primarily with the United States, while the central provinces have been 
11 h d f d f . . 48 equa y staunc e en ers o protect1on1sm. 
On the Canadian periphery, the Maritimes, British Columbia, and to 
some extent the Prairies, feel that their regions gain only marginally 
as producers from being part of the Canadian economic structure because 
they possess many of the essential constitutional powers over the deter-
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minants of their economic growth. Further, it should not be surprising 
that most provincial governments attempt to promote their own economic 
objectives in international economic life by endeavoring to create the 
economic climate most suitable for their own needs and by seeking foreign 
capital to strengthen their resource sectors as well as to diversify 
h . . 49 t e1r economes. 
The statistics certainly support this idea. In terms of manufac-
tured products, the Atlantic provinces, Newfoundland, Prince Edward 
Island, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, have 54.4 percent of their trade 
within the region, 19.4 percent with other areas of Canada, and 26 
percent with other countries. British Columbia consumes 48.6 percent 
of its own manufactures, trades 15.1 percent with the rest of Canada, 
and 36.4 percent with other countries. 50 Thus it would seem that, 
"a provincial government in whose territory a particularly valued 
resource is concentrated finds that it must concern itself with the 
international marketability of that resource much as an independent 
· · ·1 · would do. " 51 state 1n s1m1 ar c1rcumstances This economic concern of 
the provinces stems in part from the fact that they are legal owners of 
the public lands within their borders and the resources therein. 
On this basis, we may well ask whether a national economic policy 
is even possible. The federal response to these economic cleavages has 
come in the form of equalization payments, conditional grants, and incen-
tives offered by the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE). 
Admirable as these measures are, they have created their own problems. 
All involve joint administration to some degree and the danger involved 
lies in the politicization of the issues under joint administration. 
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These dangers have been recognized for some time. J. A. Corry has 
stated that "success in Dominion-Provincial cooperation in administration 
d d . 1 1. . " 52 d b. b . f epen s entlre y upon persona ltles, a u lous asls or success 
indeed. He states further that, "the experience with conditional grants 
leads us to doubt whether joint administration of activities by the 
Dominion and a province is ever a satisfactory way of surmounting 
constitutional difficulties."53 
The gradual weaning away of some federal powers and the assumption 
of these powers by provincial governments, primarily in economic matters, 
has been seen by some as a failure of national economic policies. Donald 
Smiley has argued that "the breakdown of the Keynesian welfare state is 
in my view the most crucial element in the rise of provincialism in both 
domestic and international affairs."54 Coupled with this notion, or 
flowing from it, is the emphasis on foreign policy as an extension of 
domestic social and economic policies. "Because jurisdiction over these 
social and economic matters is divided between the federal and provincial 
governments, the latter almost inevitably become more important in 
Canadian external affairs, than when Canadian foreign policies and 
foreign commitments were determined primarily by factors related to the 
security of the non-communist world."55 
This rise in provincialism and its attendent concerns with the 
marketability of provincial products and resources has sparked a prolif-
eration of provincial offices in foreign countries. One of the diffi-
culties of federalism, from the provincial view, in terms of attracting 
investment from foreign sources, relates to the fact that the provinces 
are represented abroad by federal personnel, often non-natives of the 
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province for which they are responsible and charged with the responsi-
bility of equally representing all provinces. The difficulties of this 
situation are obvious and some provinces, that is, those with the 
resources to do so, have decided that they may better represent them-
selves than depend on the federal government. Not surprisingly Quebec 
and Ontario maintain the largest number of offices abroad. Quebec is 
represented in London, Paris, DUsseldorf, Mllan, Brussels, Tokyo, New 
York, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Dallas, and New Orleans. Ontario 
has offices in London, DUsseldorf, Mllan, Brussels, Vienna, Stockholm, 
Tokyo, New York, Boston, Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveland, Mlnneapolis-St. 
Paul, and Los Angeles. The remaining provinces do not approach this 
level of activity. 56 Newfoundland, Manitoba and Prince Edward Island 
have no offices abroad; Nova Scotia has offices in London, Paris, New 
York and Boston; New Brunswick is represented in London, as is Saskat-
chew an. Alberta has offices in London, Tokyo and Los Angeles, and 
British Columbia in London, Los Angeles and San Francisco. 57 
Cultural factors have given use to provincial international acti-
vity as well. The most visible province in terms of international 
activity has undoubtedly been Quebec. "French-Canadian disenchantment 
with Canadian foreign policy due to its alleged anglophone bias is a 
fundamental reason for the development of a parallel French-Canadian 
58 foreign policy carried out primarily by the government of Quebec." 
Durham's comment that he found "two nations warring in the bosom of a 
single state" has retained its appropriateness to today. The existence 
of a significant cultural and linguistic minority confined in a single 
geographical area has had profound implications for Canadian federalism. 
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The expression of French-Canadian culture on the international scene in 
the face of a perceived English-Canadian bias, is in some respects, 
agitation for greater domestic recognition, in constitutional terms, of 
that culture. Officially, Canada is a bilingual country, yet federal 
participation and interest in the world-wide French-speaking community 
was minimal until Quebec's efforts seemingly began to undermine federal 
authority. As Levy argues, "in some respects, the concern of provincial 
governments with Francophonie filled a void in Canada's external rela-
tions because, in the early and mid 1960's, the federal government had 
not yet worked out a consistent set of domestic and foreign policies to 
deal with the crisis of Confederation stemming from French-Canadian 
society."59 According to Levy, during the period marked by the "Quiet 
Revolution" in Quebec, coupled with a series of unstable minority 
governments in Ottawa, "Quebec politicians began to aggregate societal 
pressures and a policy of rapproachment with the French-speaking world 
60 became a prominent undertaking of successive provincial governments." 
In addition, the difficulties that arose between Ottawa and Quebec over 
Quebec's participation in Francophonie were instrumental in mobilizing 
the interest of French-Canadian minorities in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia 
and Manitoba. Indeed, the participation of these provinces was in some 
respects an attempt by Ottawa to reduce the visibility and prominence 
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of Quebec. 
D. Conclusions 
In an overview of provincial participation in external affairs, 
62 Thomas Levy and Don Munton have identified two sets of factors which 
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underlie the greater degree of provincial participation. Background 
factors include, the greater prominence of economic and social issues 
on the national and international agenda, the increasing prosperity and 
complexity of Canadian society, persisting regional social and economic 
differences, and increasing disparities in economic growth. The theme 
which pervades these factors is an economic one and its effects are 
profound. II • in the area of international economics there are clear 
signs of differing provincial assessments of Canada's 'national 
interests. '"63 A similar conclusion, arrived at by the Task Force on 
the Structure of Canadian Industry led them to comment that, "the desire 
of each province to get as much job-creating investment, including 
foreign direct investment, as it can has created a tendency toward 
minimal constraints on, and maximum encouragement of, foreign ownership. 
It is clear that no policy toward foreign investment can be effective 
unless it is a national policy which, by its nature, transcends a 
. 1 . 1 . ,.64 str1ct y reg1ona perspect1ve. 
Here again, the problems of regionalism or provincialism are stated. 
Obviously, Canada's provinces seek to maximize economic benefits to 
themselves. Equally obvious is the fact that in doing so, they operate 
from a functional viewpoint. The same may be said of the political 
factors underlying provincial involvement in external affairs; the 
greater number and complexity of problems facing provincial governments, 
the expansion of provincial bureaucracies, and the relatively weakened 
position of successive minority federal governments during the mid 
1960's. 65 As the capacity and perceived necessity of provincial action 
in areas previously monopolized by the federal government increased, 
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p r ovincial activity increased as well in response. To these factors 
must be added the effect of physical closeness of provinces and American 
states. This situation has "made north-south international relation-
ships between the Canadian provinces and bordering states of the United 
States of America appear to be a natural phenomenon in view of the 
coordinated governmental action required to meet joint problems."66 
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CHAPTER III 
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY OF THE 
PROVINCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND 
Introduction 
Newfoundland became a province of Canada in 1949. Its entry into 
the Canadian confederation was unique, as was its history, when compared 
to other provinces. 
Newfoundland was a British colony which was granted representative 
institutions in 1832 and responsible government in 1855. Constitution-
ally, therefore, the province held the same Dominion status as did 
Canada. However, the Statute of Westminster (1931), though it applied 
to Newfoundland, was never adopted by the province's legislature. As 
well, though it was a Dominion, Newfoundland was not a separate member 
of the League of Nations. 
In 1933, the Dominion of Newfoundland suffered bankruptcy and at 
its request, responsible government was suspended and replaced by 
Government by Commission in 1934. The Commission functioned as both 
legislature and executive, subject only to disallowance by the Imperial 
Government. In effect, the island had reverted to the status of a 
British colony. 
The temporary prosperity of the war years led to expectations of a 
return to responsible government or the new alternative first explored 
seriously in 1946, of union with Canada. After a protracted debate and 
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two referenda, union with Canada was the choice of the Newfoundland 
people. In the negotiations leading to the Terms of Union, the province 
claims that by agreement between representatives of Newfoundland and 
Canada, Newfoundland's status reverted to that of a Dominion just prior 
to the finalization of the Terms of Union. 1 The implications of this 
claim for the subject under discussion are unclear and consideration of 
its ramifications, beyond the scope of this study. However, one tenta-
tive point may be made. International law recognizes as full interna-
tional "persons," only those political entities which meet the usual 
criteria of a state. These criteria include a distinct people who 
inhabit a settled territory which possesses a government that has both 
internal and external sovereignty. Under the British North America Act, 
no Canadian province meets these criteria. However, international law 
recognizes the concept of "partial international personality" or 
"partial international competence" as emanating from political units 
which at some point in their histories have had original international 
personality and retained a degree of it on entering a federation. 2 
There may be grounds, assuming the provincial claim is tenable, for the 
argument that Newfoundland has a better historical and constitutional 
claim to some degree of external sovereignty than any other Canadian 
province, and perhaps is comparable to the constitutional position of 
certain German Lander. 
In the period 1855-1934, when Newfoundland unquestionably held 
Dominion status, it has been noted that the island remained free from 
"exalted ideas of sovereignty in the field of foreign affairs" and 
relied instead on the policy, and particularly the foreign trade nego-
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tiations of the Imperial Government. 3 Any claim which Newfoundland may 
have to partial international personality is not compromised by the fact 
that the island did not exercise the rights accompanying Dominion 
status. Oliver Lissitzyn has noted, for example, that the lack of 
regular diplomatic relations of a dependent entity with foreign states 
is not of conclusive significance, "since in many types of treaty 
relations it is expressly provided or tacitly assumed that other channels 
4 
of communication are open". 
The question of whether Newfoundland may have a claim to partial 
international competence is beyond the scope of this study and properly 
rests in the realm of legal and constitutional arguments pursued by 
5 
others. It is noted here in an attempt to highlight the fact that 
Newfoundland's history contains events and trends which influence the 
provinces' contemporary international activity. 
Newfoundland, like Canada, has had and continues to have close ties 
with Great Britain. The severing of certain of those ties has, however, 
been more recent in Newfoundland's case. The population of the island 
is composed almost entirely of persons of English, Scottish and Irish 
descent and cultural links with these nations are common and strong. 
Reinforcing these cultural ties is the geography of the province. 
The fact that Newfoundland is an island helps to foster a feeling of 
separateness and uniqueness which tends to maintain cultural traditions. 
As an island, Newfoundland is not contiguous with any other province, 
or, as in the case of some provinces, with a neighbouring American state. 
Despite the decision to become part of Confederation in 1949, by 
the very small majority of four and one-half percent, one would 
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still expect Newfoundlanders to look more often to the east than to the 
west. Support for this contention may be found further, not only for 
Newfoundland but for the remainder of the Atlantic region in the economy 
and trade. 
Writing in 1949, just after Newfoundland had become Canada's tenth 
province, H. B. Mayo concluded that "in many respects the economy of 
Newfoundland is like that of the other Maritime Provinces, the example 
of which surely confirms that Newfoundland cannot expect from union any 
great economic benefits."6 At the time of Confederation, Atlantic area 
trade consisted mainly in the export of fish and timber to the New 
England states, Great Britain and the West Indies. The opening of 
Western Canada and the development of the wheat economy there resulted 
in a national economy, if indeed it could be termed "national," based 
on regional specializations. In itself, this is no obstacle to inte-
gration, but the north-south pattern of trade flows and the threat of a 
tariff to its traditional markets, left the Atlantic region unable to 
successfully penetrate the Central Canadian market. In response, Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick began to develop their own immigration and 
trade promotion policies by establishing offices in London. 7 
At the same time in Newfoundland, the economy was based primarily 
on the export of fish, the export of minerals which could be used in 
the new technologies, the production of forest related products and on 
defense installations (primarily American), while manufactured commodi-
ties were brought from the outside. Thus the economy was dependent to 
a large degree on world market conditions. 8 After Confederation, 
Newfoundland, and in an earlier period, the Maritimes as well, had hoped 
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to turn from overseas markets to the North American and especially the 
national market as the basis for prosperity. It was hoped that this 
renewed vitality would be based particularly on coal, fish and manufac-
tured goods. "However, prevailing conditions showed that the Maritimes 
were competitive with, rather than complementary to, central Canada."9 
This situation has had the natural result of causing Newfoundland and 
the Maritimes to look to markets other than the national one in the 
export of their products. The Atlantic Provinces Economic Council 
observes, for example, that the resource based and primary processing 
industries of the Atlantic region rely heavily on foreign export 
markets. Its estimate is that approximately one-quarter of the gross 
regional (Atlantic) income is generated in the export sector and that 
this trade is heavily concentrated in a few markets; fifty-one percent 
by value to the United States, nineteen percent to Great Britain, ten 
percent to Latin America, and nine percent to the Commonwealth Prefer-
10 
ence Area and Western Europe. 
Other factors of consequence to this analysis are the general 
service needs which arise in any administration and which may be expected 
to generate contact with other jurisdictions. Examples of such service 
needs include information exchanges of technical data, legislative 
requirements and reciprocal agreements in the field of transportation 
and communication. 
A. Research Framework 
The international activity of Canadian provinces has long been a 
concern of the federal government and of students of federalism. In 
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the context of the broad issue of federalism and international affairs, 
the legal and constitutional aspects of provincial international acti-
vity have been extensively examined. This study aims to participate in 
a new trend in the literature--an analysis of the tangible manifesta-
tions of provincial international activity. 
In Canada, this new trend has focused on transborder relations 
between provinces and American states and generally the international 
activity of Quebec. The literature is as yet relatively incomplete in 
terms both of its scope and methodology. For example, the international 
activity of all provinces has not been examined, nor is there a consis-
tent treatment of data by all investigators. Accordingly, the present 
study was undertaken to investigate the international activity of the 
Province of Newfoundland in an effort to determine its nature, scope 
and intent and to attempt to draw some tentative conclusions as to its 
similarity or lack thereof, with that of other provinces. 
1. Methodology 
Data was gathered through informal interviews with the administra-
tive head of each department of the Newfoundland Provincial Government. 
In some cases, additional interviews were conducted with other adminis-
trative personnel or specialists. 
It is important to note that a number of interactions are not 
included in this study. These are of two types: those not included 
through deliberate omission and labelled 'political' in Leeson's 
typology, and those not reported by the provincial government. 
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Leeson's typology included a functional category titled 'political' 
and defined as "trips, visits, junkets, and other legislative or execu-
tive contacts between officials of provincial and other governments." 
This category was not included in this study primarily because only two 
contacts of this nature were reported and they did not fall within the 
definition of 'political' as defined by Leeson. Recently, representa-
tives of the Newfoundland provincial government travelled to London to 
lobby British parliamentarians concerning the issues surrounding the 
patriation of the British North America Act. This international contact 
would fall under the definition above and would have been included in 
this study were it within the time period studied. This is obviously 
an example of legislative and perhaps executive contact. However, the 
two reported contacts between 1960-1978 concerned trips by the provin-
cial premier to the United States in an effort to influence opinion in 
that country concerning the Newfoundland seal hunt. Both trips were 
assisted and promoted by the federal department of External Affairs and 
involved neither executive nor legislative contact by the Premier with 
his counterparts in either state or federal levels of government in the 
United States. On this basis they were omitted from this study. 
The second group of interactions not included consist of those 
interactions not reported by the provincial government. Here, the 
assumption is made that all international contact by the Newfoundland 
provincial government is not reported in this study. This assumption 
is based on two factors: the attitude of provincial officials and the 
manner in which data are maintained on provincial international acti-
vity. 
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In the initial stages of data collection the Newfoundland Inter-
governmental Affairs Secretariat was contacted in the hope that it acted 
as a clearing house for the provinces international contacts. It was 
suggested by the Secretariat, however, that the provinces' involvement 
in international activity was minimal and that the only possible approach 
would be to canvas individual departments. Contact with individual 
departments resulted in referal to the Intergovernmental Affairs Secre-
tariat and it was only during the course of personal interviews with 
representatives of each department (usually the deputy-minister), that 
international activity was discovered. On the basis of this process, a 
number of conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, the Intergovernmental 
Affairs Secretariat's primary purpose is to deal with relations between 
Newfoundland and Ottawa and other provinces of Canada, and no officer 
of the Secretariat has specific responsibility for international rela-
tions. Nor does the Secretariat have any mandate to deal with inter-
national relations since the official view is that any international 
activity undertaken by the province is conducted through the federal 
government. Secondly, it is highly probable that the volume of informal 
international activity is greater than reported, basically because it 
is not perceived as 'international' but as "purely functional, utili-
tarian • (and) related to the province's needs." 11 Thirdly, it is 
likely that the volume of formal relations reported is relatively com-
plete. Though provincial officials are reluctant to label such activity 
'international,' the method of its conduct, i.e., through a jointly 
signed document or a continuing committee, is such that the likelihood 
of some evidence of its existence being recorded is much greater than 
is the case with more informal relations. 
2. TyPOlogy of Newfoundland's International Contacts 
For the purpose of this study, international activity is defined 
as any contact between the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador or 
its agents and any foreign government, its component units or its 
agents. Relations coming within this definition are organized in a 
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classificatory scheme which owes much to that employed by Howard Leeson 
in his study of Alberta/Saskatchewan transborder relations. 12 This 
method was chosen in an effort to maintain some consistency in treatment 
of data with other studies in the same field. 
Leeson's typology is a synthesis of several others and like those 
others is intended to apply to "transborder" interactions, those between 
Canadian provinces and American states. In the case of Newfoundland, 
consideration was given to a wider range of contacts including those 
other than United States contacts. With few alterations Leeson's 
typology has been adapted to include non-transborder contacts as well. 
The definitive typology employed is as follows: 
Agreements - Any interaction undertaken in writing and either 
jointly signed or agreed to by correspondence. 
Arrangements - Any interactive procedure not necessarily involving 
signed documents or correspondence which has the agreement of 
all parties. Essentially, this category involves all inter-
actions not expressed as commitments made through signed 
correspondence. 
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Function 
Economic - Any interaction that is essentially economic in nature, 
including those involving energy resources and other natural 
resources. 
Environmental - Any interaction involving measures for the preser-
vation of the environment. 
Human Services Interactions which facilitate private or public 
Frequency 
contacts in categories such as transportation and social 
welfare. 
Regular - Any interaction which occurs with regularity, such as 
annual conferences or regular committee meetings; or an agree-
ment or arrangement which necessitates a continual high level 
of interaction. 
Occasional - Interactions which happen more than once, but which 
have no fixed pattern of occurrence. 
Unigue - An interaction necessitated by a particular event which 
does not carry with it the necessity for any future trans-
national contact between the actors involved. 
Method 
Province-Other - Interactions which are undertaken by the province 
and other governments and exclude the Canadian federal govern-
ment. 
Province-Federal Government-Other - Interactions which include the 
province, the Canadian federal government and a foreign 
government. 
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With the exception of the Departments of Consumer Affairs and 
E · 13 M . . 1 Aff . d H . R h b ·1· . d nv1ronment, un1c1pa a1rs an ous1ng, e a 1 1tat1on an 
Recreation, 14 and Rural Development, 15 the remaining thirteen depart-
ments of the Newfoundland provincial government are involved in varying 
degrees of international activity. The extent of this activity on the 
basis of the typology outlined above is shown in Table 2. 
The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador reports a total of 36 
interactions with foreign states, or subunits thereof, over the period 
1960-1978. Of this total, 11 interactions are agreements, or more 
formal contacts, while the remaining 25 interactions take the form of 
arrangements, or less formal contacts. On a percentage basis, 30.6 
percent of interactions are the more formal agreements, while the 
majority, 69.4 percent are arrangements. 
All of the agreements are of the regular variety with the majority, 
nine, being conducted directly, without the federal government as 
medium. Arrangements are more equally distributed by frequency, with 
direct and indirect interactions forming almost equal proportions. It 
is significant that both agreements and arrangements tend toward a 
fairly regular mode of interaction with no agreements falling in the 
'unique' category and only three of 25 arrangements being so categor-
ized. 
Table 3 indicates the extent of Newfoundland's interactions with 
states of the United States. The total number of interactions with 
American states is slightly less than half, 16, of all interactions. 
The majority, 10, take the form of the more formal agreements, while 
the remainder are arrangements. Expressed as a percentage, 90.9 percent 
Table 2 
Newfoundland's International Activity- All Contacts 
Agreement Arrangement 
Regular Occasional Unique Regular Occasional 
Prov.- Prov. Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- Prov.-
Other Fed. Gov. Other Fed.Gov, Other Fed.Gov. Other Fed. Gov. Other Fed.Gov. Other Other Other Other Other 
Economic 1 2 1 2 3 
Environ- 2 
mental 
Human 8 5 3 3 3 Services 
Column 
Totals 9 2 0 0 0 0 7 4 5 6 
-- TOTAL --
11 Agreements 25 Arrangements 
30.6% 69.4% 
Unique 
Prov.- Prov.-
Other Fed. Gov. Other 
1 
2 
3 0 
00 
N 
Table 3 
Newfoundland's International Activity- American Contacts 
Agreement Arrangement 
Regular Occasional Unique Regular Occasional Unique 
Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- P Prov.- Prov.- Prov.-Fed. Gov. Fed. Gov. Fed. Gov. Fed. Gov. rov.- Fed. Gov. Other Other Other Other Other Fed.Gov. Other Other Other Other Other Other Other 
Economic 1 1 1 
Environ- 2 
mental 
Human 7 1 2 1 Services 
Column 8 2 0 0 0 Totals 0 1 0 3 0 2 0 
-- TOTAL --
10 Agreements 6 Arrangements 
27.8% 16. 7% 
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of all agreements are with American states, while 24 percent of all 
arrangements are with American states. In terms of the frequency of 
interaction, all 10 agreements that Newfoundland has with United States 
states are of the 'regular' variety, while the majority of arrangements 
are conducted at a lower level of frequency. 
The method of interaction by the province with American states is 
primarily direct. Only two of 10 agreements were mediated through the 
Canadian federal government, and only one of seven arrangements are so 
conducted. 
As indicated by Table 4, the picture for non-American contacts is 
somewhat different. Arrangements constitute 95 percent of all non-
American interactions and 76 percent of all arrangements are with non-
American sources. Only one agreement has been concluded with non-
American contacts. The one agreement is a regularized, direct contact 
while the arrangements are divided almost evenly between regular and 
occasional interactions. The mode of interaction of non-American 
arrangements also reflect a dictotomy between direct and indirect 
contacts. 
An analysis of Newfoundland's international activity by function 
(Table 5) indicates that the majority of interactions occur in matters 
dealing with human services (transportation, social services, health, 
etc.). The functional area which has the next highest proportion of 
interaction is economic, taking 27.8 percent of the total interactions. 
Environmental areas of interaction assume only 5.5 percent of the total. 
As a proportion of total contacts, Newfoundland has a greater 
number of interactions with non-American areas in the economic and human 
Table 4 
Newfoundland's International Activity- Non-American Contacts 
Agreement Arrangement 
Regular Occasional Unique Regular Occasional 
Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- Prov.- p Prov.- P Prov.-Fed. Gov. Fed. Gov. rov.- rov -Other Other Other Fed. Gov. 0 h Fed. Gov. Oth ' Fed,Go'V. Other Other Other t er Other er Other 
Economic 2 1 1 3 
Environ-
mental 
Human 1 4 3 1 3 Services 
Column 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 2 6 Totals 
-- TOTAL --
1 Agreement 19 Arrangements 
2.8% 52.8% 
Unique 
Prov.- Prov.-
Other Fed. Gov. Other 
1 
1 0 
00 
\.J1 
Table 5 
Distribution of Interactions by Function 
Economic 
Environmental 
Human Services 
Column Totals 
American 
Economic 
and 
Environmental 
Human Services 
Column Totals 
Agreements 
1 
2 
8 
11 
Table 
Non-American 
American 
3 
2 
11 
16 
44.4% 
Arrangements 
6 
9 
16 
25 
Interaction by 
Total 
10 
2 
24 
36 
Function 
Non-American 
7 
13 
20 
55.6% 
Percent 
27.8 
5.5 
66.7 
100 
Total 
10 
2 
24 
36 
86 
87 
services categories, as reflected in Table 6. Non-American contacts in 
the economic sphere, however, appear to be the only significant diver-
gence from international activity on the part of the province, which is 
generally equally divided between the states of the United States and 
other nations. 
B. International Activity of the Province of 
Newfoundland/Labrador 
An analysis of Newfoundland's international activity reveals that 
its generation is primarily a result of what are here termed "service 
needs." Service needs are defined simply as those aspects of the day-
to-day operation of a government which require solution through admin-
istrative action. While the fulfillment of these needs generate much 
of Newfoundland's international dealings, other factors are evident as 
well. Table 7 displays the full range of reported international activity 
of the province. 
The Department of Forestry and Agriculture through ~he Canadian 
federal government and in company with the Atlantic provinces and 
Quebec, participates in joint forestry research projects with the 
American federal government and Maine. The common concern is forest 
damage as a result of spruce budworm infestation. In addition, the 
department has had contact with the countries of Scandinavia concerning 
the marketing of Newfoundland newsprint and pulpwood, and with Scotland 
in areas involving exchanges of technical personnel, recruitment of 
personnel and exploration of certain logging techniques in Scotland 
which have been successfully adapted to Newfoundland conditions. 16 
Department 
Forestry 
and 
Agriculture 
Finance 
Labor & 
Manpower 
Table 7 
Newfoundland's International Activity by Provincial Government Department, Foreign Contact, 
Title and Purpose of Interaction, Type of Interaction, Function and Date 
Foreign Contact 
Scandinavia 
Scotland 
Maine, American 
Federal Government 
American Federal 
Government 
Luxembourg 
U.S. Securities & 
Exchange Commission 
(State of New York) 
Various (through the 
International Labor 
Organization in Geneva 
Great Britain 
Various American 
states 
Title and Purpose 
of Interaction 
Exploration of Markets for 
Nfld. newsprint & pulpwood 
Technical assistance from 
Scotland as well personnel 
exchanges in regard to 
cable logging operations 
Canadian-American forestry 
research project investi-
gating control of the 
spruce budworm 
CANUSA--A bilateral agree-
ment involving the exchange 
of technical information 
The province borrows, 
floats bond issues, etc. on 
the European market 
The province borrows, 
floats bond issues, etc. on 
the American market 
Information exchange 
Department personnel have 
received technical training 
in Great Britain 
The Department holds active 
membership in the Interna-
tional Association of 
Government 
Type of 
Interaction 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Agreement 
Agreement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Arr.angement 
Agreement 
Function 
Economic 
Economic 
Environ-
mental 
Environ-
mental 
Economic 
Economic 
Human 
Services 
Human 
Services 
Human 
Services 
Date 
1976 
1974 
Ongoing 
1978 
Ongoing 
Ongoing 
Ongoing 
Ongoing 
Ongoing 
Ongoing 
1976 
Method of 
Contact 
Prov.-Fed. 
Other 
Prov.-Fed. 
Other 
Prov. -Fed. 
Other 
Prov.-Fed. 
Other 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Fed. 
Prov.-Fed. 
Other 
Prov.-Other 
•••. continued 
Department 
Justice 
Fisheries 
Mines and 
Energy 
Tourism 
Foreign Contact 
Various1 
V . 2 arlO US 
State of Maryland 
V . 3 arlOUS 
Great Britain 
V . 4 arlO US 
V • 5 arlO US 
American Federal 
Government 
V . 6 arlO US 
Table 7 (cant' d) 
Title and Purpose 
of Interaction 
Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Judgments Act 
Maintenance Orders 
(Enforcement) Act 
Information exchange on 
adult corrections policy 
Market Research; promo-
tional activity 
The department maintains an 
office in London on a tem-
porary basis for the purpose 
of promoting the fishery 
Information exchange (Mines) 
Information interchange re: 
offshore oil and gas explor-
ation and development 
The Mines Division of the 
department receiving assis-
tance of a technical nature 
in the establishment of a 
Computerized Mineral 
Deposits Service 
The sailing schooner "Norma 
& Gladys," owned by the 
provincial government has 
been used for tourism and 
fisheries promotion 
Type of 
Interaction 
Agreement 
Agreement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Function 
Human 
Services 
Human 
Services 
Human 
Services 
Economic 
Economic 
Economic 
Economic 
Economic 
Human 
Services 
Date 
1970 
1974 
1976 
Ongoing 
(3-4 
times 
per yr) 
1978 
Ongoing 
Ongoing 
1977-
1978 
1975-
1976 
Ongoing 
Method of 
Contact 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Fed. 
Other 
Prov.-Fec. 
Other 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Fed. 
Other 
••.• continued 
Department 
Tourism 
(cont' d) 
Education 
Health 
Industrial 
Development 
Foreign Contact 
Great Britain 
Federal Republic 
of Germany 
State of Maine 
Colorado 
States of Maine 
& Massachusetts 
Various (through the 
United Nations) 
V . 7 ar1ous 
Great Britain 
St. Pierre & 
Miquelon 
Great Britain 
States of Vermont, 
Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire & Rhode 
Island 
Table 7 (cont'd) 
Title and Purpose 
of Interaction 
Cultural Affairs inter-
changes 
Tourist Promotion 
Exchange of Newfoundland 
caribou for Maine grouse 
Newfoundland otter sent 
to Colorado 
Tourism Promotion 
Educational Conference 
for which the Adult and 
Continuing Education 
Division prepared a paper 
The department partici-
pates in OECD Regional 
Atlantic Committee 
Frequent exchanges of 
administrative personnel; 
teacher training programs 
Extension of health care 
services to St. Pierre et 
Miquelon when such ser-
vices are unavailable on 
the islands 
Recruit~ent of health care 
personnel 
Conference of Maritime 
Premiers and New England 
Governors 
Type of 
Interaction 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Agreement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Agreement 
Function 
Human 
Services 
Human 
Services 
Human 
Services 
Human 
Services 
Human 
Service 
Human 
Services 
Human 
Services 
Human 
Services 
Human 
Services 
Human 
Services 
Economic 
Date 
Ongoing 
1978 
1962 
1978 
1976 
1977 
Ongoing 
1975-
1976 
Ongoing 
Ongoing 
1977-
1978 
Ongoing 
1973 
Method of 
Contact 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Fed. 
Other 
Prov.-Fed. 
Other 
Prov. -Fed. 
Other 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Other 
Prov.-Other 
.... continued 
Table 7 (cant' d) 
Department Foreign Con tact Title and Purpose Type of Function Date Method of 
of Interaction Interaction Contact 
Public Works State of Wisconsin Membership in the National Agreement Economic Ongoing Prov.-Other 
and Association of State Pur- 1972-
Services chasing Officials 1973 
Social States of New York, Adoption of Newfoundland Arrangement Human 1971- Prov.-Other 
Serviees Maine & New Jersey children Services 1977 
States of Maine, New Reciprocity agreements rela- Agreement Human 1974 Prov.-Other 
Hampshire & Delaware ting to the licensing of Services 
Transpor- motor vehicles 
tation States of Vermont, Conference of Maritime Pre- Agreement Human 1973 Prov.-Other 
Connecticut, Maine, miers and New England Services 
Massachusetts, New Governors 
Hampshire & Rhode 
Island 
Notes 
1 Includes, among others, the United Kingdom, Queensland, Australian Capital/Territory and the State of Victoria, Australia. 
2 
others, Malta, New Includes, among Guinea, New Zealand, Republic of Singapore and Southern Rhodesia. 
3 
others, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Norway Includes, among and Japan. 
4 Includes, among others, Australia, India, France and the U.S.S.R. 
5 Includes Scotland, England, Norway and Iceland. 
6 Includes, among others, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain. 
7 Includes, among others, France, Great Britain and the United States. 
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In the area of transportation, agreements involving the reciprocal 
recognition of vehicle registrations are in effect between the province 
and the states of Delaware, New Hampshire, and Maine. Interestingly, 
these agreements, contained in exchanges of letters between the province 
and the states indicated, came about through the lobbying of individuals 
and organizations involved in the transport of goods between Newfound-
land and the United States. 17 As well, the Provincial Department of 
Transportation attended the Conference of Maritime Premiers and New 
England Governors in 1973. The departmental representative participated 
in discussions on transportation during the Conference although nothing 
substantive resulted. 18 
Through the Department of Justice, the province has agreements with 
19 
several states regarding the reciprocal enforcement of judgments and 
. d 20 malntenance or ers. In 1976, the Division of Adult Corrections was 
requested by the Maryland Department of Fiscal Services through the 
Canadian Embassy in Washington to provide information on the criminal 
. . . h . 21 JUStlce system ln t e provlnce. 
In the area of health care, the province's Department of Health 
has finalized an "informal" arrangement with the islands of St. Pierre 
and Miquelon, to provide health services that are beyond the resources 
of the islands. The Deputy-Minister indicated that no formal agreement 
would result and that the arrangement was merely for the sake of conven-
ience.22 In addition to this activity, the province actively recruits 
health care personnel in Great Britain. Initially, the federal Depart-
ment of External Affairs provided liason in the recruitment process but, 
as an ongoing process, personal contact by Department of Health personnel 
1 . d 23 are re le upon. 
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The role of other factors in the generation of international acti-
vity by the province is illustrated in the area of education. The 
provincial Department of Education is, in the opinion of the Deputy-
24 Minister, more oriented toward Great Britain than the United States. 
Primarily, there are two reasons for this view; firstly, the presence 
of strong traditional ties between the province and the 'mother' country, 
and secondly, the feeling that as part of the North American ethos, 
Newfoundland should seek alternatives to the American or Canadian 
approach to education. In addition to this general orientation, specific 
foreign contact has occurred in exchanges of administrative personnel 
with Great Britain. Such exchanges are intended for the exchange of 
information, administrative techniques in education and to provide 
personnel on both sides with new skills and ideas. As well, the Depart-
ment participated in the preparation of a report for the United Nations 
on Adult Education in Canada through its Division of Adult and Continuing 
Education, and maintains active participation in the Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) through the Regional 
Atlantic Centre of that organization, of which the Deputy-Minister of 
Ed . . b 25 ucatlon lS a mem er. 
Membership in professional associations has led to international 
activity on the part of the province. The province holds membership in 
the International Association of Government Labor Officials (IAGLO) 
through its Department of Labor and Manpower. The IAGLO is a Canada-
United States organization comprised of state governors and provincial 
ministers of labor and its purpose is to provide a forum for the discus-
sion of matters of mutual interest in the labor relations field. Con-
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ferences are held on an annual basis and are attended by the provincial 
Mlnister of Labor and Manpower from Newfoundland. 26 
As well, the Department has a variety of international contacts 
through the International Labor Organization of the United Nations 
(ILO), located in Geneva. Current contacts through the ILO are mainly 
concerned with matters of occupational health and safety. In dealing 
with the ILO, the departments' contacts are often coordinated by the 
federal government through the Canadian Association of Labor Commis-
sioners, but provincial Labor and Manpower officials have had direct 
contacts as well. In addition, the department periodically receives 
requests for information of a technical nature from many countries, 
27 
although these usually, but not always, come through the ILO. 
Finally, Department of Labor and Manpower officials have received 
training of a technical nature in Great Britain. Similarly, the Depart-
ment of Public Works and Services has had extensive contact with the 
state of Wisconsin, among other American states, through the National 
Association of State Purchasing Officials. 28 
The Department of Tourism has had extensive contact with American 
states primarily through its Wildlife Division. For example, in 1962, 
Newfoundland caribou were sent to the state of Maine in exchange for 
Maine grouse. As well, otter from Newfoundland waters have been shipped 
to Colorado. In the area of tourism promotion, the department attends 
Tourist Trade Shows in Europe on a regular basis. It is interesting to 
note in this area as well, that stemming from a meeting of the Confer-
ence of Maritime Premiers and New England Governors in 1976, the 
Province proposed a tourist package with the states of Maine and Massa-
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chusetts. The package never came to fruition due to lack of funds on 
the part of Maine and Massachusetts. 29 
Additionally, a cultural exchange program is administered by the 
department, resulting in frequent interchanges of museum and art exhi-
bitions with Great Britain. 
In 1975-76, the province purchased a fishing schooner named the 
"Norma and Gladys" which serves the dual purpose of promoting the 
province's tourist attractions as well as the fishing industry. 
The Department of Social Services has also had some international 
contacts. The influx of Vietnamese children to North America when the 
war in Vietnam ended saw a positive response from the people of Newfound-
land. Through the International Children's Placement Agency and the 
Federal Department of Employment and Immigration, the Department of 
Social Services laid the groundwork for the adoption of Vietnamese 
children by Newfoundland families. While no actual adoptions took 
place, the department had prepared a program. 
The main area of contact has been with the United States. In 1971, 
the province had a large number of children available for adoption and 
was finding placement difficult. According to the Director of Child 
Welfare for the province, three American states, New York, Maine and 
New Jersey were chosen for an adoption program, primarily due to their 
closeness to the province. The program was operative during the period 
1971-77 and the department worked through the American Consul-General 
in the province. In the United States, the placement agencies utilized 
included the Adoption Resource Exchange of North America (ARENA), the 
Massachusetts Adoption Resource Exchange (MARE), the Sister Mary Eugene 
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Foundation and the New York Foundling Hospital. The Director of Child 
Welfare indicated that the program was a very positive one (it ended in 
1977 due to a lack of Newfoundland children available for adoption) in 
h . h h . d d b Am . h . . 30 w 1c t e greatest cooperat1on was exten e y er1can aut or1t1es. 
Visits to the Departments of Fisheries and Mines and Energy 
revealed a very considerable difference in attitude ±n relation to other 
departments. As primary resource sectors, encompassing issues and 
policies which are often points of contention between the province and 
the federal government, there is a definite feeling of independence in 
the departments that administer these areas. The Department of Fisheries 
maintains extensive and frequent contact with foreign states. In fact, 
the department maintained a temporary office in London during 1978 for 
the purpose of promoting the Newfoundland fishery in Great Britain and 
Europe. Delegations at the Deputy-Ministerial level travel to foreign 
jurisdictions on the average of three to four times a year. These 
visits are primarily for the purpose of gathering information in areas 
such as fish-farming, vessel and gear technology and market technology. 
The Deputy-Minister of Fisheries pointed out that the position of 
Newfoundland is often contrary to that of the federal government in many 
marine resource areas and where this is the case, representatives of 
the province state their case without consideration as to the obvious 
conflict which may be perceived by foreign interests. 31 Similarly, the 
Energy Division of the Department of Mines and Energy is concerned with 
regulations governing the development of offshore oil and mineral 
resources. Consequently, the department's contacts with its counterpart 
organizations in Scandinavia, Scotland, England and Ireland are frequent. 
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The Mlnes Division of the department is involved in extensive 
information interchanges with many American states as well as Australia, 
India, France and the U.S.S.R. among others. In 1977-78, the Division 
received technical assistance from the United States on the establishment 
of a Computerized Mlneral Deposits Service for the province. 
The general practise of the provincial government is to utilize 
the services of the federal department of External Affairs and its 
representatives abroad where provincial officials are unsure of the 
territory or where External can facilitate contacts. Usually, however, 
after the province has developed relationships of its own, or through 
External Affairs, the role of the federal government ends and provincial 
representatives make their own way, at times, not bothering to inform 
federal officials of their activities. The overall impression, and 
indeed, the facts, support the notion that there is nothing covert about 
Newfoundland's relations with foreign states. Provincial officials 
simply go about doing their jobs concerned not with the constitutional 
implications of their activities, but rather the administration of the 
departments of which they are a part. As Edward McWhinney has stated, 
[Transnational agreements are] very often concluded, not by 
the Prime Minister of the province or his cabinet, but by 
intermediate rank civil servants who have acted on a purely 
functional, utilitarian basis related to the province's 
needs, and dealt directly with their civil service counter-
parts in other countries without apparently being aware that, 
in doing what comes naturally, they may have created concep-
tualistic problems for latter-day commentators.32 
C. Newfoundland's International Activity and 
that of Other Canadian Provinces 
When viewed in relation to the activity of other provinces, New-
foundland's international activity is not atypical. Obviously, when 
one talks in terms of the 'scale' or extent of international contact, 
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Newfoundland does not compare with Ontario, Quebec, Alberta or British 
Columbia, but relative to its size, its interests, the attitudes of its 
leaders, and its resources for the conduct of such activity, Newfound-
land's position exhibits some similarity to that of other provinces. 
Since studies examining provincial international activity have 
employed different units of analysis, a variety of perspectives, and a 
tendency to emphasize 'transborder' contacts, only 'gross' comparisons 
are possible. These are illustrated in Table 8 for a number of vari-
ables. 
A reasonable comparison is possible among all five studies on only 
one variable--the degree of formality of provincial international 
activity. 33 Four of the studies indicate that the majority of inter-
actions are conducted at an informal level. At this level of inter-
action, signed documents creating legal duties and responsibilities are 
not utilized. Swanson, for example, concludes that for most states, 
"state/provincial interaction is largely an informal affair."34 Simi-
larly, Leeson found that formal agreements have not been signed in a 
wide range of activities despite the fact that formal and informal 
interactions in the Alberta/Saskatchewan case are of similar proper-
tions. In this study, most of the formal interactions were confined to 
the transportation area. Leeson concludes that Alberta/Saskatchewan 
Formal 
Informal 
Most Active 
Functional 
Category 
Frequency 
of 
Interaction 
Actor 
Role 
Method of 
Contact 
Prov.-Other 
Table 8 
Comparison of Selected Studies of Provincial 
International Activity 
Present Swanson Leeson Leach, Walker Study Levy 
28.9 29.3 44.2 55.9 
71. 1 70.6 55.8 44.1 
Human Human Human Human 
Services Services Services Services 
Regular Regular 
(92%) (54%) 
73% 87% 
Prov.-Fed.Gov. 27% 13% Other 
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Johannsen 
21.1 
78.9 
Bureaucratic 
(81%) 
100 
and state governments "are more willing to enter into informal arrange-
ments on a wide variety of subjects than they are to formalize such 
35 
arrangements. 
The Leach, Walker and Levy study reported a higher proportion of 
formal interactions. Leach et al. suggest that this result may be a 
function of the fact that formal interactions involving substantiating 
documents are more likely to be retained as records than less formal 
36 
activity and therefore are more likely to be reported. 
Comparisons for other variables are tenuous if not impossible in 
most cases, again because of the different methodologies employed. It 
may be stated generally, that where comparisons are possible, the data 
tends to support the findings of the present study. For example, human 
services is the most active functional category for four of five studies 
and there are similarities between the present study and Leeson's 
analysis of Alberta/Saskatchewan transborder contacts in terms of 
frequency of interaction and method of contact. 
Although tested in most of the studies under discussion, incomplete 
reporting of when interactions occurred makes comparison difficult. As 
a general statement, the majority of interactions appear to be recent. 
Swanson notes that of 33 agreements concluded in the transportation 
category, 84.8 percent occurred in the period 1960-74. 37 Similarly, 
Leeson notes that ''most interactions are of a recent nature (post 1960) 
. d" . . . . 1138 1n 1cat1ng a grow1ng propens1ty to 1nteract. 
What emerges from an attempt to compare the existing studies of 
provincial international activity is the tentative conclusion that it 
is in the main, informal, functionally oriented toward human services, 
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regular in nature, does not usually involve the federal government of 
Canada and is a recent phenomenon. A significant research effort is 
required to verify these conclusions. 
Footnotes - Chapter 3 
1This point is one of the central tenets of the Newfoundland 
Provincial Government's argument for jurisdiction over offshore oil 
and mineral rights off Canada's east coast. 
2 Thomas Allen Levy, "The International Status of Provinces," 
unpublished M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1970, p. 30. See also, 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
For the purpose of this study and indeed for the whole issue of 
provincial international activity, it is important that a realistic 
perspective is maintained. Under the British North America Act (1867) 
there is no definitive determination of the respective powers of the 
federal government and the provinces in foreign affairs. Section 132 
of the Act is inapplicable to contemporary events. The question of 
treaty implementation, however, has been settled since 1937, when the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the implementation of 
any treaty made by Canada must follow the distribution of legislative 
powers as defined by Sections 91 and 92 of the B.N.A. Act. 1 In effect, 
the implementation of the terms of treaties dealing with matters under 
provincial jurisdiction is the legitimate concern of Canadian provinces. 
As a nation, Canada cannot undertake obligations under such treaties 
without provincial consent. For example, the Draft Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of 
Marriages was opened for signature at New York on December 10, 1962. 2 
Since "solemnization of marriage" falls under provincial jurisdiction, 
the Secretary of State for External Affairs corresponded with all pro-
vincial premiers, inquiring whether, in the light of their provinces' 
legislation in the field of marriage, "it would be feasible for Canada 
to become a party to the United Nations Convention." 3 This process is 
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followed whenever the subject matter of a treaty falls under provincial 
jurisdiction. Where a treaty's subject matter falls clearly under 
provincial jurisdiction, the federal government is unencumbured by this 
process. 
In the absence of a clear determination of treaty-making authority, 
Canadian provinces have claimed such power, 4 though little support can 
be found for this position. While it is true that the practice of 
certain federal states appears to lend support to the provincial argu-
ment, comparisons with the Canadian case are questionable. Some Lander 
of the federal Republic of Germany, and cantons of the Swiss federation 
exercised a treaty-making power prior to Confederation in their roles 
as sovereign states. The constitutions of both countries provide for a 
limited treaty-making power for their subunits in certain areas and 
always under central government control and supervision. Similarly, 
the constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics provides 
for a restricted treaty-making power on the part of the member union 
republics and the constitution of the United States implies that states 
may enter into compacts with the consent of Congress. Neither case is 
strictly comparable with Canada where no province possessed a treaty-
making power prior to Confederation5 and there are no applicable consti-
tutional provisions. 
Attempts to formulate an international law of treaties have seen 
efforts to include some provision governing the conduct of states 
members of federations in international law. All such attempts have 
failed. Proposed draft articles for such a law of treaties indicate 
that sovereign states may be prepared to recognize an international role 
for states members of federations if constitutional authorization is 
present but on no other basis. 6 
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Nevertheless, Canadian provinces are engaged in extensive inter-
national activity with no apparent international legal consequences, 
perhaps because the "treaty involvement" of Canadian provinces is 
minimal. With the exception of the province of Quebec, no province has 
purported to conclude a treaty with a foreign state or part thereof. 
Here, the term treaty is used in the sense of a "treaty proper," an 
agreement between sovereign states for some specific purpose as arms 
control or mutual defense. It is evident that provinces have concluded 
"lower level" or "administrative" agreements, but not with sovereign 
states. Rather, these agreements have been concluded with subunits of 
states or at the bureaucratic level. Such activity cannot be defined 
as political nor as threatening to Canada as a sovereign state. None-
theless, the federal government, in an effort to provide supervision 
and control of provincial international activity, has, in its position 
paper on "Federalism and International Relations," 7 provided a framework 
within which the provinces may act internationally. From an interna-
tiona! law point of view, the Canadian approach legitimizes provincial 
international activity by effectively making provinces agents of the 
federal government, removing ultimate responsibility from the provinces 
and placing it in the federal government. 
Research in the area of provincial international activity currently 
suffers from a number of deficiencies, the most important of which is 
probably lack of comparability due to divergent methodologies. In this 
context, only general conclusions are possible. Overall, provincial 
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international activity appears to be largely informal, rooted primarily 
in the administrative needs of provinces and dominated by a level of 
interaction best described as administrative agreements. At the same 
time, activity is regular, that is continuous, and possibly increasing, 
with a greater frequency of interactions since 1960. 
In general, the international activity of the province of Newfound-
land supports these conclusions. Insofar as comparisons are possible, 
Newfoundland's activity is not atypical of that of other provinces. 
Newfoundland's primary export and staple is fish and in the 1920's, 
Sir Richard Squires, then premier, established trade offices for the 
promotion of this product in the United States, in New York and Boston, 
8 
and in Spain, Portugal and Italy. During Mr. Joseph R. Smallwood's 
tenure as premier, 1949-1972, again for the promotion of fish products, 
he appointed trade commissioners in Jamaica, Portugal and Spain. 9 These 
activities indicate only that the provincial administration has been 
concerned with the effective marketing of the province's resources and 
could not be construed as a conscious attempt to establish a role for 
Newfoundland in foreign affairs. Indeed, Mr. Smallwood is known as an 
ardent federalist, and his position is that the Newfoundland government 
and he, as premier, were very happy to have the federal government's 
department of external affairs working in Newfoundland's interests. In 
Mr. Smallwood's opinion, there was never any question of the fact that 
external affairs was indeed working in the province's interests. 10 Mr. 
Smallwood stated that during his years as premier, he was very active 
in the promotion of the island's interests, but always under the aegis 
11 
or ~ith the knowledge and consent of the federal government. 
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The approach taken under Mr. Smallwood has not changed appreciably 
today. In a letter from the Intergovernmental Affairs Secretariat, the 
executive director set out Newfoundland's position on provincial inter-
national activity: 
Since the Government of Canada has the constitutional respon-
sibility for negotiations with foreign countries the Govern-
ment of Newfoundland and Labrador relies upon the Federal 
Department of External Affairs to represent our interests 
abroad.12 
As if to reinforce this position, the letter further states, 
Notwithstanding the fact that certain provinces have 
recently established Provincial offices in various foreign 
capitals I am not aware of any plans on the part of the 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador to move in this 
direction. Such duplication of facilities and services 
with those presently offered by the Federal Department of 
External Affairs does not appear to be justified given 
our Provincial involvement in international activity.13 
Nonetheless, the province's involvement is fairly substantial. 
Some authors have sought the underpinnings of provincial interna-
tional activity in the fact that certain provinces have contiguous 
borders with American states. However, the problems arising from the 
existence of a common border between two distinct political entities 
and therefore a joint approach to the solution of these problems cannot 
be applied to Newfoundland. An approximation of this situation for 
Newfoundland would be proximity rather than contiguity. The question 
then becomes, is geographical closeness, in the absence of a common 
border, a necessary condition in the generation of interaction? The 
answer in Newfoundland's case is probably that mere proximity may be 
considered a sufficient condition but not a necessary one. Figure 1 
shows American states which interact with the province. Of nine states 
which have agreements or arrangements with Newfoundland, all but two 
N.J. 
MD. 
Figure 1: American States Interacting with Newfoundland 
111 
are situated in the northeast United States. In other words, the 
majority of American states interacting with the province are those 
states which are closest to Newfoundland. While this situation supports 
the importance of proximity, other factors as well must be noted. The 
most important of these is probably the effect of historical trade 
patterns, particularly as that trade related to fisheries. Of less 
importance is the fact that the United States is Canada's major trading 
partner. 
It is important to note as well, that over half of Newfoundland's 
. . 1 . . . . 1 14 1nternat1ona act1v1ty 1s transnat1ona • This fact may distinguish 
it from other provinces, but such a conclusion will have to await 
further research. In this regard, Newfoundland's historical connections 
and location in reference to Britain and Europe offer explanatory vari-
ables. Howard Leeson 15 offers a similar conclusion in regard to settle-
ment patterns and historic contacts between Alberta/Saskatchewan and 
adjacent American states. 
It would appear that for a variety of reasons, most of which are 
not threatening to the federal government's prerogatives in the conduct 
of foreign relations, provinces engage in international activity. The 
recognition of this activity by the federal government through the 
establishment of 'umbrella' agreements with other states is a positive 
approach which should resolve some of the conflicts involved. At the 
same time, however, this approach may give rise to problems in the 
future. For example, Oliver Lissitzyn has observed, "the older British 
Dominions, Southern Rhodesia, the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republics and, shortly before attaining independence, the 
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Philippine Commonwealth, as well as some other entities, all developed 
their treaty-making capacity through the very process of entering into 
16 international agreements." Similarly, Professor H. Gordon Skilling 
has argued that the sending abroad of Canadian representatives of a 
non-diplomatic character to fulfill Canadian needs which could not be 
satisfactorily promoted by British diplomatic machinery was prerequisite 
. . h . h f 1 . 17 to ga1n1ng t e r1g t o egat1on. In other words, the international 
activity of provinces today may have similarities to the international 
activity of Canada before it gained full independence from Great Britain 
in the conduct of foreign relations. De facto provincial international 
activity may have the potential to give rise to internationally legal 
and acceptable activity by the subunits of federal states. 
This, and many other elements, are properly topics for future 
investigation. As stated previously, the literature in this area is 
relatively undeveloped but future research will encounter obstacles 
which must be overcome if answers are to be found. In the case of 
Newfoundland, the major problem is two-fold; firstly, an attitude is 
present that the province does not conduct international activity and 
secondly, there is no central store of information on the province's 
international dealings. In this case, the latter problem flows from 
the former. As obstacles to research, the significance of these pro-
blems should not be underestimated as they indicate much about the 
nature and intent of the province's international activity. 
The status and extent of future provincial international activity 
will depend in large part on the successful resolution of problems in 
the Canadian confederation. The distribution of the rights and benefits 
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of Confederation in a manner of equality and fairness should ensure that 
provincial international activity is merely a legitimate expression of 
diverse interests and needs and not an occasion for conflict. 
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Footnotes - Chapter 4 
1A . . Ge 1 f C d A Ge 1 f 0 . d ttorney rtera · or ana a vs ttorney nera or ntar1o an 
Others (1937), A.C. 326. 
2Information provided by the Department of Justice, Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador. 
4
counsel for Ontario in the 1937 Labor Conventions Case declared 
that "Ontario has a right to enter into an agreement with another part 
of the British Empire or with a foreign state" (1937), A.C. 326 at 333. 
Also in 1965, Premier Bennett of British Columbia states that, 
"all the resources of Canada belong to the provinces, not to the federal 
government; it is therefore their exclusive right and prerogative to 
negotiate agreements or to seek new markets for the development of their 
resources," Le Devoir (Montreal, July 7, 1965). 
5Again, Newfoundland is a possible exception. 
6 See pp. 26-34, supra. 
7 See pp. 35-36, supra, Chapter I. 
8I . . h M J R S 11 d M h 9 1978 nterv1ew w1t r. • • ma woo , arc , • 
10Ibid. 
11Ibid. 
12Letter from the Executive Director of the Intergovernmental 
Affairs Secretary to the author, March 17, 1978. 
13Ibid. 
14 See Table 3, p. 83, supra. Transnational refers to contacts with 
foreign states other than the U.S. Transborder refers to contacts with 
American states. 
15 Leeson, A Survey and Analysis, p. 2. 
16Lissitzyn, Efforts to Codify or Restate the Law of Treaties, 
p. 1183. 
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17H. Gordon Skilling, Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency 
to Embassy (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1945), p. 107. 
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